24 AUGUST 2020 . 

My Journey through Life with the Assam Regt

JOHNY MUKERJEE

Formative Yrs

At age eight years, I had set my mind on joining the RIMC – I had heard about it from my friends in school. Much to my father’s dismay, I insisted on sitting for the RIMC all India entrance test – I came first in the all India merit list. At the last moment however my father refused to allow me to join. As I grew older my eyesight had deteriorated, I was forced to consider joining the Army. I then appeared for the UPSC CDS Entrance Exam, to join the NDA. I appeared for the exam and came first, then went for the SSB interviews, and the medical tests – I cleared all and was selected to join the 24^th NDA Course and joined in July 1960. We were awarded an ISc degree when we passed out after our final examination. We passed out of the NDA, in June 1963 and moved to the IMA. Due to the war the IMA had cut out all ceremonials and frills and only a shortened wartime training course was being run. We passed out and were commissioned on 9 Feb 64 after a simply parade.

At the IMA one of our pl cdrs was a very smart Capt Bahugana from 3 Kumaon. He had impressed me as an offr and as we were to give our choices as to which Regt we wished to join, I gave my choice as the Inf, even though I was a science stream cadet from NDA and for Capt Bahugana’s Regt. He assured me I would get my choice as I was within the first ten of the IMA’s Order of Merit. I was overjoyed and duly purchased all the uniform accoutrements such as the belt, beret, heckle, badges and so on, of the Kumaon Regt.

Little did I know that then Capt S K Pillai, another very smart pl cdr from the Assam Regt and had got the approval for me to be given his bn – 3 Assam. My knowledge of the ASSAM Regt was limited to SM and Hony Capt Guneswar Bora, also known as “Sakatwala”, from 3 ASSAM, who was the Drill SM (the first Indian to take over from the British Regtl Sgt Maj Ayling) – a tremendous man who was greatly respected and feared by all of us cadets at the NDA. I have yet to see a SM of that stature again in the Army! Despite this, I did not wish to join the ASSAM Regt – in those days, it was not considered a good Regt. It had recently had a mutiny in one of its bns, its men were reputed to be perpetually AWOL, and they came from areas where insurgency was spiralling out of control.

On 7 Feb 64, I was informed that I was to be commissioned to 3 ASSAM. I was furious and that is the last time I remember shedding copious tears. I tried my best to get it changed, but in reply was only counselled, ‘The ASSAM Regt needs good offrs – you will not regret it’. I thus received my commission into the Assam Regt with no fan fare on 9 Feb 64. So, off I went – most unhappily to report at the ARC, Shillong as a 2^nd Lt. How times have changed! Today the Assam Regt, is now one of the most sought after in the IA – even taking their pick of the offrs they want.

Regtl Orientation

We had been first sent to the ARC for Regtl Orientation before being sent to our bns. In those days, we had a much longer period of attachment with the ARC than today.  When we reached Shillong Out Agency we were met by  a JCO from the ARC – our stuff was loaded into a truck and we drove to the ARC at the other end of town – we were then housed in the Trg Bn along with the rects as was the case with all new offrs.

We spent only a few days at the ARC, which was commanded by, (then) Col T Sailo. During this time we were lectured nonstop on various facets of the Regt. On the fourth day, at the dep parade, we were given a lecture by Col Sailo and were sent to 8 Mtn Div, which was deployed on CI ops in Nagaland. We (2^nd Lt Yogi Ahluwalia and I) were to spend almost the next two months under the tutelage of Papa Pande, then Dy GOC of the Div and our Col of the Regt.

We went by rd to Gauhati and then by train to Dimapur. Insurgency was at its peak in Nagaland, so we had to travel on specified convoy days and convoy timings. At Dimapur, we were put up at the home of SM (Retd) G Angami of 1 ASSAM, who recounted stories of the Battles of Jessami and Kohima of the World War II. During each of these night halts spent at homes of retired Rhinos, we learnt more about our men – about their life style, priorities, beliefs, approach to life, their families and attitudes, customs and so on and about their people.

We spent one night with Papa Pande, who regaled us with stories about the Regt. The night we spent with Papa Pande remains a vivid experience even 56 years later. He then sent us off to see the World War II battle fds of 1 ASSAM in Manipur, Jessami, Kharasom and Kohima with guides from the Regt, who briefed us on the battles on ground. We also visited all the cemeteries and war memorials. It was a tremendous experience which is still vivid in my memory, 56 years later.

In Manipur, we stayed with men of some of our different tribes – Kukis, Paites, Mizos, Anals, Tangkhuls, Maos, Rengmas and Meiteis and in Nagaland with most of the Western Naga tribes including the Aos, Angamis, Chakesangs and Lothas. Each time, we stayed with a veteran Rhino; it helped expand our knowledge about the NE and the Regt and which gave us a comprehensive insight into the area, its peoples and the soldiers and this period. It was an excellent foundation on which to begin our ‘real’ Army career.

We travelled extensively on foot with our pl sized escort from the RAJPUT Regiment. After this remarkable adventure, we left Nagaland to report via Shillong to our units.

Recruiting Trips to learn about the men

By now I had forgotten all my passing out regrets! At that time, the ARC used to send out recruiting parties; such parties were detailed from the Bns of the Regt. The advice at the time was that offrs were encouraged, till the completion of six years’ service, to give up their annual leave (60 days) each year on recruitment drives(with the help of veteran Rhinos of the Regt). Thus, my first years’ leave in 1964 was spent on a recruiting trip to Mizoram. Then, in early 1965, I went to South ASSAM and Khasi, Jaintia Hills and Garo Hills, in 1966 to Tripura, in 1967 to East Nagaland and Tirap, Changlang and Lohit. In 1968 recruiting was in Upper Assam – Nowgong, Jorhat and undivided Dibrugarh. In 1969 our recruiting campaign took us to Kameng, Subansiri, Siang and Dibang districts of Arunachal and Sonitpur and North Lakhimpur districts of ASSAM.

Thus, our knowledge and experience we gained during this time, of our men and their homes was almost unparalleled. This practice of personally recruiting our soldiers died out after the 1971 war. I wonder whether there is any scope of reintroducing this experience in today’s Army as I feel that many of our offrs of today have only ltd and bookish knowledge of the Regt and our men! 

When I joined 3 ASSAM the CO was Lt Col N Ramachandran and the SM was G C Rajbongshi, both extremely competent men in their respective fields and worth emulating. The bn was at that time stationed at New Mal Junc in North Bengal, having mov there from Hasimara about six months ago and about to proceed on a long exercise. I was assigned as a pl cdr to B Coy with the JCO being Sub Imtinangshi Ao.

In the persisting 1962 war hysteria the bn was posted 1500 men against an auth of 806! My pl had 100 men posted against an auth of 36! We were 32 offrs against 12 auth, incl then Maj Jackson De Cruze (formerly a Sgt from the Royal Sigs), Maj S S Walia, Capt S K Sharma, Capt L K A R Das, Lt D S Rai, 2^nd Lt T K Bardhan (the senior most 2^nd Lt), 2^nd Lt Lanky Manral. The rest of us were all 2^nd Lts incl Martin Khongmen and Lalit Mohan Sah. We were pl str of subns. We were from all walks of life – a college professor, an actor, a film director, a policeman, farmers, a restaurant owner and many others who had all joined out of sheer patriotism. All 22 of us 2^nd Lts, young and full of undirected energy, creating total and utter confusion! Our bosses often ran out of ideas of what to do with us other than train and train and train!

Dining in and Burning Hut  

              3 Assam was located about a km away from New Mal village (with a paan shop manned by a beautiful Gurkha girl and was therefore always patronised by the Bn) in the midst of tea gardens on the foothills of the North Bengal Himalayas. The entire Bn was housed in bamboo huts on the pattern of a tribal village of NE India. As I reached I was taken to the Bn HQs and was introduced to the CO, 2IC and the Adjt – four of us 2^nd Lts had reported for duty together – self, a 2^nd Lt Ahlawat (an ECO), 2^nd Lt Y K Ahluwalia (again an ECO) and a 2^nd Lt Chakravorty (another ECO) we were informed that we would be dined in (welcomed) at the Offr’s Mess as is customary that evening. We were then sent off after completing necessary documentation to report to our assigned Coys – mine being B Coy.

In the evening as required we reported to the Offr’s Mess in our field mess dress which was olive green bush shirts and trousers. We were then introduced to all the offrs. As was customary we were plied with alcohol whether we were accustomed to it or not. We were thus totally drunk by the time we went in for dinner, which was a semi formal affair served in three courses. This was followed by a toast to the President. After this we had been advised that we all had to give a speech of at least 45 mins regarding ourselves which was to be followed by a toast to the Bn. I was to be last to speak – it seemed an interminable wait with Alhawat’s speech being, I was born on …. punctuated by long pauses and a ‘what next’! I vaguely remember giving out my life history and then going off to sleep at the table. I was thereafter told that we were carried out to our Qtrs for the night.

              I had been put in one room of a three room bamboo basha with a very shaky bamboo floor. The other side of the basha was occupied by the 2IC, Maj Jackson D’cruz. The basha was lit by a lantern on a rickety bamboo table. I was half carried in and dumped on the bed where I somehow took off my clothes and collapsed on the bamboo bed. When I collapsed on the bed, the table had apparently shaken, and the lantern had fallen on the bamboo floor and broken – unknown to me the floor had then caught fire which rapidly spread to the rest of the basha. I awoke to discover I was being carried out from the basha naked by the duty JCO. I was later told that the 2IC had bolted out of his side of the basha with his pyjamas burning! I was there after debarred from staying anywhere near the 2IC! That is the description of my first day with 3 Assam, also colloquially called the ‘Phantom Rhinos’.

Capt Lalit Mohan Sah

I can never forget to pay tribute to this Rhino veteran. He was from ECO 1 in 1963, consequent to the Chinese aggression. He was an English College Professor from Naini Tal, who joined out of sheer patriotism, even though he was doing extremely well in civilian life. He did very well with us in 3 ASSAM – he was our hockey team Capt, who took us on to win the Div Hockey Championship. He, however, left in early 1965. As soon as the 1965 War broke out he joined up the second time out of sheer patriotism under the res liability clause. On his demand he was back with us in 3 ASSAM. He left in 1968 and rejoined immediately following 1971 and again demanded and got 3 ASSAM. A pure blooded Rhino and patriot – a wonderful man with tremendous Rhino spirit – there is so much to learn from him for today’s’ and future generations!

My First Collective Trg

After two days, we set off on our first maj collective trg ex into the hills of North Bengal and Sikkim; at that time ASSAM Regt Bns had been classified as jungle tps and were to be trained to operate behind enemy lines for long periods of time. In this ex our Bn was to act as Chandals (Chinese), as the enemy to the div. We were tasked to overrun the Div HQs using Chandal tactics, i.e., by an attack by infiltration from the rear. The ex went through all the stages – moving to the conc area, then the assy area, then moving to and preparation of the firm base defs in a HAA. This was followed by infilt the “ex en lines”, through thick jungle over a route of about 100 kms. Once we had completed the infilt we firmed in behind the en and carried out recce and ptl msns to ident our objs. The ex was to culminate in the overrunning of the Div HQ.

We were to move totally cross country through the jungles on man pack basis – our orders were to carry 7 days’ amn, 3 days’ rations, wpns and EI Clo (winter clo). Another 5 days load made up of rocks were added to our packs for endurance trg. We were to be self contained with no resupply and live off the jungle for the duration of the ex (over a month). For this duration we lived with the men and ate with them. That is where I learnt to eat everything that mov in the jungle (incl wild cats, hyena, birds of all types, bear, elephant and deer besides other animals and insects) as also all sorts of jungle vegetables and herbs! We learnt jungle craft/lore and about tribal traps and what our men were capable of. It was stupendous! Needless to say we were successful and ended the ex one week early with the bn overrunning the Div HQs, with all its actions being totally undetected. It is important for our offrs to ensure that we do what is required to nurture these skills, as our men are also much more urbanised than before.

Regtl Trg to be a Good Offr

Shortly after the ex was over in Mar 64, we moved to our op area in East Sikkim and North Bengal Hills, with 2 Assam relieving us at New Mal Junc. My vivid recollections of the pd are that we were with our men day and ni. In those days, till you had completed six months’ service, you lived with them and trained and trained and trained – day and night. There was not a hill in North Bengal or Sikkim that we had not climbed and ex upon. The 100 str pl would fall in, in the morning with me in front and my senior JCO behind – he would then salute and give me the report in our typical regtl Hindi and after that he would order me in English – “Join in Sahib”! I was thereafter one of the members of the pl under his comd and trg to learn the craft as a ldr. I learnt so much from Sub Imtinangshi Ao – a gem of a JCO.

Sr Sub

The Army had a custom of nominating the sr most sub (denotes combination of 2^nd Lts and Lts) as the ‘sr sub’ in charge of all other subs including our disc, adherence to customs and offr like behaviour. In our case the sr sub was Lt Dharam Shamsher Rai, a happy go lucky and music loving offr from Nepal and North Bengal (relations from both places – a wonderful man who had the unfortunate and onerous task of keeping his pl worth of subs in order.

All of us being young and bubbling with energy were always upto some mischief or the other. Every night he used to fall us in front of his tent and give us a moral lecture for a min of one hr after dinner – sometimes this used to extend to two to three hrs before he let us go to bed – this put us off to no small extent as we had to get up for PT parade by 0430 am every morning. All 22 of us therefore decided to teach him a lesson. He used to stay in a large square comfortable tent – the rest of us used to live in tiny 40 lb tents (which were about 6 feet by 5 feet) with two of us jr 2^nd Lts to a tent in the offr’s colony called the “Bhangi Colony” close to the offr’s mess. We therefore got together one night after our nightly sermon, a waited in the bushes for the bn and Dharam to go to sleep. At about 1 am we pulled out all the tent pegs holding up his tent and collapsed it on the sleeping sr sub – we then did a Naga dance on top of the tent and him for the next 15 min before we rushed off and went to sleep.

Next morning at the PT parade at 5 AM there was hell to pay. We were duly produced before the CO, he didn’t say much to us other than that we must be given opportunity to expend our excess energy and to teach us a lesson of disc. We were ordered to return with our complete pls in complete FSMO with 7 days rations and amn and EI clo and blankets – about 80 kgs of load on our backs. We were then given a route for a speed march of about 200 kms to be executed in four days with check points enroute where we were checked. So much for our teaching the Sr Sub a lesson!

Adjutant’s Legacy                                                                                                                                                           In early 1965 I had been temporarily been appointed the IO who was responsible to look after all int aspects for the bn’s operations and assist the CO. This warranted a fair amount of office work in close coordination with the Adjt at the Bn HQs. One fine day we were all horrified when we were informed by the Rly Station Master that 13 wagon loads of timber sleepers had arrived for us and that we should pay the due amount of some Rs 20 lakhs!!

I was asked to investigate and find out what all this is about. I checked and found that the timber had come to us correctly from COD Cheoki and that we had demanded it through the trg br of the Bn HQrs, for making tgts for firing practice. The indent had been prepared by the training clerk who had put the decimal point in the wrong place, i.e. instead of demanding some 13.000 sq m of timber the demand read about 13000.00 sq m of timber or 13 wagon loads of it. The matter was reported to the CO who almost had a heart attack – and started thinking of selling his wife’s jewellery to pay for it! Fortunately good sense prevailed with us all and we managed to get all our friends in other units of the entire div purchase some wood – the entire timber was thus distributed and paid for by all through the trg grants. Subsequently we all had a good drink at the expense of the Adjt!

1965 Indo Pak War – Dinhata and Krshnanagar

              In Jul 65 we moved to Dinhata, our conc area near Cooch Bihar in North Bengal in local forests and groves in preparation to advancing into East Pakistan in anticipation of orders in the 1965 Indo Pakistan War. Here we carried out crash op oriented trg and op recce, as we had prior to this been prepared for mtn warfare against the Chinese – whereas we were now required to be prep for ops in the riverine terrain of East Pak. The Bn remained poised at Dinhata along with the rest of the fmn, to enter East Pak till the war ended in Sep 65 – we thereafter continued to remain so poised till the Tashkent Agreement in Jan 66.

Mechanical Transport Officer at Krishnanagar

While at Krishnanagar, after 2 and half years as a Coy offr and then as a pl cdr, I became the MTO – we had just taken over the MT from another unit. The tpt was all old World War II vintage, in very bad condition – snub nosed Chevrolets and Dodges. My attempts at ‘Geru Chuna’ (painting up the area) were snubbed by the CO. He said “Do not ever waste your time on doing such frivolous things! Know your job and ensure you and your men perform well in executing your duties. All you have to ensure is that your area and vehicles are neat and clean your vehs roadworthy and that all of your men know how to drive and maint your vehs properly.”

Moral Courage

We then had the inspection of our MT, and much to my discredit, we got a “Bad” remark for the state of our vehs, along with instrs for a re-insp after two months. The CO’s remarks on the insp report sent onto to the Bde Cdr and the GOC read, “I am not unduly concerned by the remarks of the insp offr, given the state of the tpt that we took over – necessary remedial action will be ensured”. I learnt so much from his moral courage. Since the “Bad” report also reflected on the wkshop, we received total coop from them and after two months, we earned an “Excellent” report at the next insp.

Sometime thereafter, we offrs were all lined up at 8.30 AM and awaiting a first visit from the new Div Cdr. We waited till 9 AM – there was still no sign of the Gen. Our CO, then Lt Col N Ramachandran, told us to break off and carry on with our trg and that as and when the GOC came, he would bring him to the trg areas to meet us. I was then offg as the IO and so was with the CO. The GOC arrived at 09.30 AM – 1 hour late. CO came out of his office to receive him as he arrived. The GOC asked, “Where are your offrs?” The CO replied, “Sir, my men are busy trg – how can the offrs be away from their duties? They waited for 30 minutes, but as you were late I sent them to carry on with trg. You will meet them in the trg area”. The GOC accepted the CO’s comment with a smile – “You are right” said the Gen. The lesson learnt that day, was of punctuality and earnestness in doing one’s duty! How many Regts have had offrs like that to train under? There were so many other stories. Those were the good old days!

Qualities/Characteristics of Our Men seen as a pl cdr

I learnt of the wonderful qualities of our men – simplicity, truthfulness, honesty, loyalty and courage. It was necessary to earn our men’s respect as an offr. Times have of course now changed considerably; however, in those days if a man respected you, he would run after and salute you with a smile. He would, without hesitation, even give his life for you. If he did not respect you, he would turn the other way and pretend not to have seen you!

We also learnt about the problem of AWOL and desertion w/o arms. It must be understood that the NER was extremely undeveloped, with journeys being so difficult; it would sometimes take the soldiers as long as 30 days to reach their homes. Permissible journey periods were invariably much less. In addition, as the area was in the throes of insurgency, there were specific convoy days, which delayed movs further. On reaching home there would be a dozen things for the men to attend to – jhooming, harvesting, the wife’s pregnancy, illness and so on. There were even cases where the insurgents abducted our men. There was a lack of telecomn facilities to request for extns of leave. It is under these circumstances that the number of cases of late return from leave was fairly large, which was frowned upon by all. As per the Army Act, an absence of more than 30 days led to the man being declared a deserter. All these were treated as offences under the Army Act and were punishable. Our punishment rates were therefore also high.

Today, times have changed considerably. Comn networks have vastly improved, insurgency is under control, there has been a great deal of devp, aspirations have risen due to exposure, while jobs are now difficult to come by and with the present pay and perks, the Army has a good standing. Consequently, absence and desertion are, much much less than in our time. Also, gone are the days when a soldier would get a telegram stating, “Wife become baby – cum soon!”

Incident of New Abhor Mess Waiter

To illustrate the simplicity of our men, I must relate an incident involving one of our men who had been recently deputed to serve us at the Offr’s Mess. One day we had some offrs visiting the unit. A formal lunch had therefore been planned for them at the Offr’s Mess. The Mess was then housed in two large EP/IP tents joined together with the sides open and covered with cam nets to allow ventilation and for us to be able to call the staff loc outside easily. The staff had been trained repeatedly in their duties. The lunch was conducted as planned and Indian food had been served. There was therefore a requirement of finger bowls for the offrs to wash their soiled finger after the meal.

As I was in charge of the food (the food member of the mess committee), I sig to this Abhor tribe boy who was acting as the mess waiter with a hand sig to bring in the finger bowls – he was standing outside the tent. He thought I was joking and he sig back in exactly the same fashion with a big grin! My sig and his response was repeated three times over – as he simply could not understand! I had to get up go outside and explain to the staff to send the finger bowls! This is one of the many examples of our men’s simplicity!

In Jan 66, we were ordered to move to Krishnanagar in West Bengal, again with a similar operational task in East Pakistan. The mov was by road – an extremely interesting experience with the entire bn moving in a mix of its own tpt, addl Army trucks from the Army’s GT Coys and Civ trucks. At Krishnanagar we camped in a forest a little outside the town. Immediately after arrival Lt Col N Ramachandran our CO was posted out – there was much that I had learned from him. The new CO, Lt Col K S Brar an old offr of the Bn took over as the new CO. He was an excellent sportsman and both he and his wife were good people who had a soft corner for me. Shortly thereafter Maj Shishupal Ranpal again an old offr of the bn was posted in as the 2IC and Maj Jackson D’Cruz, posted out. We again carried out extensive trg at Krishnanagar, till we were ordered to mov our peace stn at Gaya in Aug 66.

Move to Gaya

              We moved to Gaya in Aug 66 by mil spec train – a wonderful experience, where the entire bn with all its loads moved by one train together with passenger coaches of all classes for all the men, first cl for the offrs, closed wagons for our stores and the men’s kitchens and Flat wagons for all our vehs – a long train which moved on a fixed schedule with halts at various pre-arranged stns for the men’s bed tea, breakfast, lunch, afternoon tea and dinner. As the journey also involved crossing the Ganges by ferry and change of Gauge it took approx five days to reach our destination. As we were mov to a peace stn some families joined us. The Offr’s Mess was functional and we had excellent food, beer and overall really enjoyed ourselves. 

Period in Gaya

              The Bn was in Gaya, Bihar till November 1968 and the offr’s and men’s families joined us there. I had been appointed the Adjt of the Bn and had become a Capt. Our tenure at Gaya was now spent on extensive trg for ops in the West against Pakistan. We thus hunted out canals and practiced defence and attack across them by day and night.

We also in 1967, had to move suddenly to Calcutta for IS duties at the Cossipore amn factory as the entire very large number of staff (more than 10,000) had gone on strike, was violent and the factory was under threat – we brought the sit under cont in no time. I then managed to give the offrs a tour of Calcutta’s recreational and party spots before we went back to Gaya. 

We also had a number of visits to Ranchi for trg and ex and to the hills of Neturhat for fd firing. Gaya was otherwise a good and peaceful tenure and during the same I was sent to attend the RSO Course at the MCTE, also at Mhow. The Course was most educative plus Mhow was a good break from the hustle and bustle of unit life – I recd an instrs grading on this course.

In Nov 68 the Bn was moved to Fazilka, in Punjab, again by spec train – just before the Bn mov to Fazilka, Lt Col Shishupal Ranpal was apptd the CO of 3 Assam and Lt Col K S Brar, the present CO posted out on staff. Lt Col Shishupal was a very nice person who was well liked by all. He was extremely hard working and did a lot for the Bn. Both Col Shishupal and his wife were like parents to me and we became very close. Maj S K Pillai (Later Lt Gen) one of the Bn’s old timers returned to the Bn and was appointed the 2IC. Maj Pillai being the 2IC and I had become very close as we had to work very closely together as 2IC and Adjutant.

Move to and Tenure at Fazilka

              The move to Fazilka in Nov 68 by spec train was again extremely enjoyable but relatively uneventful. The Bn had earlier been located at Fazilka in 1956 for a short period and then at Husseiniwala at Ferozepur. The Bn was located just outside the town in the ltd accn available which was adequate for only part of the Bn – the bal was housed in tentage. As Fazilka was again a peace stn families were loc with the Bn. I continued on arrival as the Adjt of the Bn. The Bn’s op role was def based on the DCB and a canal system located a few kms West of Fazilka for the def of Fazilka.

The entire period from Dec 68, 69, 70 till Mar 71, was spent on extensive trg for the op role, promotion and specialist cadres and exercises. I addition to my duties as the Adjt, I was the offr in charge of all the promotion cadres. I was therefore extremely busy. The Bn was also actively involved in Op Alert and other exs and fd firing besides routine peacetime commitments.

My close friends and compatriots at that time were, Majs S K Pillai , T K Bardhan, Maj Martin Khongmen and Maj Gurdip Singh. During this period I met my late brother in law and subsequently close friend, the late Maj L Khiangte who had just returned from the IMA where he had been an instr.

101 Comn Z Area

In Mar 70, I was posted out of 3 Assam on staff to HQs 101 Comn Z Area at Shillong as the SC ‘Q’ (Wks and Plg) out of the blue. At 101 Area I was the OIC of acquisition/requisitioning/hiring of all lands, housing and its constr for the Army, the adm of all Cantts, KLPs and Zonal Plans for mil stns and their devp in all the seven NE States which was the area of responsibility of 101Comn Z Area – a colossal responsibility which kept me extremely busy and constantly touring the NE. During my tenure I was the offr who planned the acquisition of land and constr of the Umroi (Barapani) Mil Stn in Meghalaya, expansion of Narangi and the devp and repair and maint of all mil stns and cantts in the NE.  Having never dealt with such a range of subjects before it was a tremendous learning experience for me.

After settling down at HQs 101 Comn Z Area, I visited the ARC frequently and as it was functioning under us I was in a posn to act as their LO to the Area HQs and do whatever was possible for them especially matters related to constr, land and repair and maint matters related to the MES.

I then applied formally for permission to get married as reqd by custom in the Army to my CO, the Col Adm. The wedding ceremony with Sue, Maj Khiangte’s sister, was held at about 2 PM by Pastor Luka, the then ARC Pastor. We then mov out ceremoniously under an arch of crossed dahs given by soldiers from the ARC (Hollywood style)! Some photos are given in the gallery.

By Dec 71 the sit in Bangladesh was bad and we had all been preparing for war. Besides 4 Corps ops from the East, 33 Corps from the West, it was envisaged that 101 Comn Z Area comprising equivalent of a Div size force (95 Mtn Bde, FJ Sect (Bde strength), Echo Sect (incl two coys plus  worth from the ARC and 58 GTC, an additional Bn operating from Dawki (Meghalaya), a BSF Bn), 2 Para Bn  to be dropped at Tangeil in Bangladesh, plus about a Div worth of Mukti Bahini grouped with subordinate fmns, was to advance from conc areas in Meghalaya on Tangeil and then Dacca in East Pakistan.

Op of such large forces in riverine terrain with ltd rds, obviously demanded a colossal lgs build up of lakhs of tons of amn, ord stores/clo, fuel, rations, engr stores, br eqpt, sig stores, spares for all types of eqpt, veh, med eqp, drugs and stores, canteen stores, misc other stores and est of Corps and Div Maint Areas and ests for their cont, manning and protection, close to the specified conc areas. Bengal Area was tasked in this regard to do so in Bengal and 101 Comn Z Area in Tripura, Assam and Meghalaya.

During the training of the Mukti Bahini (May/June 1971 onwards) and Lgs build up phases (Mar 71 onwards), I was put in charge of supervising the lgs build up and org of the three CMA/DMAs at Udaipur/Teliamura in Tripura, near Silchar in Assam, and near Tura in Garo Hills (Meghalaya) for 4 Corps, 8 Mtn Div and 101 Comn Z Area. We (particularly Bengali offrs) were also given charge of supervising trg of the Mukti Bahini in Echo 1 Sect at the Balat, Barsora and Shella trg camps, set up near the Meghalaya/Bangladesh Border. We were given adequate direct supervisory staff from the Regtl Centres/elsewhere to supervise the trg at each of the trg camps. Ops under our supervision from these camps were launched only from Aug/Sep onwards by which time the Mukti Bahini at the camps had been satisfactorily trained.

I was continuously on the mov between the HQs at Shillong, from where all activities were coord, the AMA at Gauhati, the CMA/DMAs, and also from May onwards once the lgs build up was up and running, to the three trg camps. In May I was also given the responsibility of making the WET and the load tables for the Tac HQs of HQs 101 Comn Z Area as they had never set up a Tac HQs before, nor had they ever moved and they were to ex comd and cont over the tps placed under comd as indicated earlier for the offensive into Bangladesh. The Main HQs was to control the trg camps and the lgs sp to 4 Corps, 8 Mtn Div, Dawki ops and the 101 Comn Z Area ops towards Tangeil and Dacca and the air maint for the air drop of 2 Para Bn.

Lgs Build Up

The lgs build up and stocking of the CMA/DMAs involved their selection in consultation with the fmns, layout, getting the fmns to staff them, arranging the tentage and dunnage for stocking, execution of op wks for storage and offices where required, water sup, elec, working out the actual stocks to be built up in conjunc with the concerned fmns and the services as per laid down war wastage rates. We had to place the demands on the Central Army depots in the rest of India and the AMA at Gauhati for the required stocks, demanding special trains for the move of these stocks to the rail heads and thence by road to the Maint Areas. Then of course there was the matter of continuous reports and returns on the same required to be rendered to HQs EC and the Army HQs.  To add to my woes the Col Adm in Nov had a heart attack and was immediately hospitalised, where he very sadly subsequently died. Consequently I was alone in the QMGs Br – I was then given an inexperienced youngster from the Ord Br to assist me in dealing with the stocking and other odd jobs.

Mukhti Bahini Raid on Chatak Pakistani Post

In Oct I recollect we had planned and executed one of our raids with the Mukti Bahini on the Pakistani BOP at Chatak Cement Factory on the Bangladesh border. We were in coy str all dressed in lungis and lightly armed and were supported by 81 mm Mors from the Indian side. The raid was silent and conducted at about 0100 hrs and was aimed at harassing and demoralising the Pak Army coy dply there and cause max cas and destruction. The op had been planned to have two pl size fire sp gps who would infilt onto the two flanks of the post, provide the fire base and an aslt gp to simulate an attack from the rear and impose casualties and destroy the Pak tpt at the post – the mors were to open up to cover our actions. The op was a great success with each pl being actually led by IA Offrs/JCOs. Such ops were quite frequent from all our trg camps, as also under the supervision of the Gurkha Bn at Dawki and the two adhoc coys (ARC Gp led by Col Y P Singh) from the Centres from then till commencement of the war on 3 Dec 71.

Final Build Up and Launching of Offensive

In end Oct I was relieved of responsibilities related to the Mukti Bahini trg and was ordered to conc totally on the lgs build up, stocking and by early Nov to the mov of Tac HQ 101 Comn Z Area to Tura, the designated conc area. All other fmns had moved onto their respective conc areas. From that time onwards our Army awaited only for orders to commence the op and adv onto Dacca. The Pakistanis obliged by launching air strikes on Indian instns and a ground offensive in the West on 3 Dec 71. India then formally declared war on Pakistan.

The IA offensive into Bangladesh commenced the same night. 101 Comn Z Area’s op was directed on axis Tura – Bagmara – Jamalpur on the River – Tangeil – Dacca. Unfortunately shortly after the adv commenced on Jamalpur, the GOC’s jeep with Gen Gill in it, drove over a land mine – he was badly injured with his leg blown off – he was immediately evacuated – I was to have accompanied him that day but I was late. The next morning Maj Gen Nagra, GOC 2 Mtn Div was nominated to take over 101 Comn Z Area and was flown in by heptr. Jamalpur, held by two coys of Pak regulars supported by two coys of Razakars, proved a tough nut to crack, inspite of intense artillery fire, air strikes and futile attempts to overrun it. It was therefore decided to contain it with a small force supported by a Bn worth of Mukti Bahini and bypass it and continue the adv to Tangeil with all speed. The Army IWT Coy at Gauhati and ferries requisitioned from Gauhati were brought in to ferry men and material across the River and bring up stores from Gauhati.

I very frankly was unfortunately not involved in acts of valour – my designated task was very clear – it was to ensure lgs sp to all fmns in the NE participating in the offensive into Bangladesh to liberate it. While doing so, I did experience repeated critical moments in the lgs sp – I remember one such incident of being rung up by all fmns – 4 Corps, 8 Mtn Div and my own fmn that, though only three to four days of the war had gone by, when we were engaging Jamalpur that they had over expended amn – they were running short on Arty and Mor amn of all calibres even though they had been stocked with 21 days of amn. It was then a herculean task getting through to HQs EC, Army HQs, 14 FAD at Narangi, and AD Panagarh and of course the rlys to get additional stocks of amn in on White Hot Priority spec trains and arrange spec amn convoys to take amn straight forward to the fmns. We however managed to get the amn to every one very speedily and just in time. The reason for the shortfall was that the war wastage rates laid down were based on the Second World War scales which saw long periods of inactivity between ops and hence lower rates/scales. We had were similar emergent requirements throughout the war.

I was then sent back by the GOC to Gauhati as it was vital to supervise the lgs build up for 2 Para Bn, which after the 2 Para Bn air drop had on 11 Dec confirmed that the airfd was secure and fit for air landed sorties, was to be air landed at Tangeil Airfield immediately thereafter. I also had to pump in stores by air and by the IWT from Gauhati for my own fmn.  Fortunately, seeing our having bye passed Jamalpur on the 6 Dec, the Pakis withdrew to Dacca on the night of 8/9 Dec. 101 Comn Z Area mean while adv with all possible speed to try and link up with 2 Para Bn at Tangeil – they of course had a number of minor engagements enroute and brs blown up across water courses which delayed the adv.

Tangeil and 2 Para Bn

2 Para Bn was air dropped on schedule at Tangeil on 11 Dec 71, with total surprise resulting in the Paki Div HQs loc there, fleeing in great haste. I was very fortunate to fly into Tangeil on the first air landed sortie with amn and radio set batteries from Gauhati and supervise the build up of stores there, with the help of the local leaders and the Mukti Bahini for both the entire fmn and 2 Para Bn. The entire op was a great achievement and faultlessly executed. 2 Para Bn immediately reorg and regrouped itself with the help of the Mukti Bahini who commandeered tpt and other essentials to continue their adv on Dacca, while the Mukti Bahini took charge of Tangeil and awaited the arrival of the 101 Comn Z Area colns advancing to Tangeil on ft. 101 Comn Z Area colns managed to finally link up at Tangeil with 2 Para Bn rear elements and the Mukti Bahini on 12 Dec 71 evening, when I also met them.

I was the First into Dacca – to buy Cigarettes!

On 11 Dec 71 evening, I discovered I had run out of my cigarettes – I was a chain smoker and smoked Charminar plain without filter cigarettes. I was quite desperate – particularly when I found that no cigarettes were available at Tangeil. I therefore caught hold of the local Mukti Bahini who were extremely cooperative. They gave me a lungi, a local escort of four men and a civ veh – we drove straight to Dacca by the side/country roads/lanes avoiding all Paki deply/blocks and reached the outskirts of Dacca – I managed to get my cigarettes, saw some Pakistani troops preparing defs at Dacca and returned to Tangeil by 0100 hours on 12 Dec 1971 – NO act of great valour. I therefore quite unashamedly and jokingly claim to have been the first IA Offr to enter Dacca – which I was!!!

Capture of Dacca, the Pakistani Surrender and Deinduction

After meeting the Tac HQs staff when they arr at Tangeil on 12 Dec 71 evening, I was directed to mov back and shuttle between Gauhati, Jamalpur and Tangeil to establish an FMA and build up stocks there, while the fmn rushed fwd on towards Dacca. In compliance with these orders I went back to Jamalpur/Gauhati and did so – I also contd to monitor the sit and ensure replenishment of stocks to 4 Corps, who were advancing on Dacca from the direction of Tripura; and 8 Mtn Div who were adv on Dacca after securing Sylhet.

On 16 Dec 71 Dacca surrendered to Indian forces irrespective of the US threat of intervention – 2 Para Bn from 101 Comn Z Area were the first tps to enter Dacca followed closely by the Tac HQs 101 Comn Z Area. As is so well known, Lt Gen J S Arora the Eastern Army Cdr accepted the surrender from Lt Gen Niazi heading the Pakistani forces on that date and the battle was won. My battle however continued on the lgs front, as we now had another 93000 POWs to feed, POW camps to be constr and our own tps kept sup till their de-induction from Jan 72 onwards. We also had to arng for the tptn of these POW to POW camps in India by tpt to rail hds and then by spec trains in India.

I was, for my efforts, related to looking after and trg the Mukti Bahini, conduct of their ops in Echo One sect and for the lgs sp to the fmns of the North East Region that I had been looking after, that I was awarded a “Mention in Despatches”.

The Mercedes and the Austin 8

In the lighter vein, one day in Jan 72, while I was supervising matters at Jamalpur near the TCP that had been set up, I saw two loaded civ trucks approaching. One had a silver Mercedes Benz and the other an Austin 8 cars loaded on them, with an Engr JCO in the front seat of one and an NCO in the front seat of the other. I had the veh stopped by the MP – I then asked the JCO – “ Saab, koi chhota chiz le jane ke lie nahin mila kya. In reply he told me that he had been ordered by the GOC 2 Mtn Div to take both vehs back to Dinjan their HQs in Assam. I had the vehs impounded and had them sent to Shillong. Enroute at Gauhati they were spotted by Gen Sagat Singh who directed the vehs be taken to his HQs at Tezpur. At Tezpur later, the vehs were spotted by the Army Cdr who directed the vehs be taken to Calcutta! The vehs remain at HQs EC till today, are well maint and are often used by the Army Cdr and the COS (I used the Austin 8 quite often when posted as COS)!

I doubt if there were many offrs in the IA who were educated/war innoculated in the lgs field as I had been. Today, I regret to say that in most cases offrs lack this edn. Also when offrs study the Bangladesh war they fail to realise that the Bangladesh war was to a large extent won because of this colossal effort on lgs sp– that is why General Maneckshaw so very sagely demanded a min of six months for the lgs build up before launching ops – it was barely adequate.

Another maj factor was the trg and emp of the Mukti Bahini, who forced the Pakistani Army to divert large amounts of resources on security and to a great degree assisted in demoralising them thereby facilitating the IA ops and their victory.

     We succeeded in reaching Dacca quickly, due to our having learnt our lesson from Jamalpur and other such locs, where we initially tried to overrun them but were not very successful, due to which we took to byepassing and containing all strong opposition.

The operations by the IAF and the IN also greatly facilitated the Indian Victory – their efforts were truly an excellent and perhaps the only true example our Armed Forces have seen of joint-man-ship.

Fazilka

Fazilka is in Punjab close to the India Pakistan border and was the scene of one of the battles fought against Pakistan while the war in the East was being waged. Fazilka is important to Pakistan as Suleimanke Hdwks on the Sutlej River, is barely one km from the Fazilka border and 16 kms from Fazilka. These hdwks control the flow of water into three maj canal systems that irrigate a maj portion of Pak Punjab. It also had the only tankable br South of Ferozpur, over which offensive operations could be launched into India. Pakistan, therefore, in times of hostilities, had always sought to launch a pre-emptive op to give depth to this area. Pakistan’s 105 (I) Inf Bde was responsible for the def of Suleimanke and was tasked to improve its def posture by capturing a portion of the Pakka enclave which jutted out towards Suleimanke.

The Indian plan for def was that of a “Fortress Concept”, with Fazilka being prepared as the Fortress (main def) for 67 (I) Inf Bde and 3 ASSAM initially dply fwd at a covering posn. 3 ASSAM was to have  three coys dply fwd, with the Bn HQs along with one rif coy and adhoc pl (MT, QM and so on) being dply in depth along the Sabuna Disty (a DCB linear def system) with some 18 brs on the DCB to def. The total frontage of the posn was over extended – about 16.5 kms. Another DCB, the Sabuna Drain, was loc about a half km in depth, but was initially not held. Amn held at the covering posn was only pouch amn, whereas the Fortress Fazilka was stocked with amn for 10 days’ battle. Only ltd def stores and mines were made available for the covering posn.

The Pakistanis commenced shelling 3 ASSAM posns at last lt on 3 Dec 71. An exodus of civs along with their livestock began from vills ahead of the DCB, moving towards Beriwala Br on the DCB, which was closest to the border and where tps of the adhoc pls were dply. Tps of Pak 6 FF followed on the heels of these refugees. These tps grabbed the br and est a foothold. Meanwhile the en launched attacks on the fwd posns of 3 ASSAM, which were ordered to wdr to the DCB towards morning. Unfortunately, part of B Coy was ambushed while wdr and they suffered hy cas, incl some men being captured. The Pak managed to somewhat extend their foothold, but were prevented further ingress by our rptd CAs and rft of the shoulders of the lodgement and areas in depth. The sit devp into a stalemate by 6 Dec 71 and remained so till the end of the war. The bn fought valiantly and suffered hy cas in difficult circumstances.

Experiences at Fazilka

Consequent to the above battle in 1971, the Bn was desperately in need of offrs. Therefore in early 72, I was posted back prematurely to 3 ASSAM at Fazilka from HQs 101 Comn Z Area, with whom I was serving during the 71 war. This was a particularly important tenure for me, as my Bn had suffered tremendously during 71. I owed it to them and to my brother in law and close friend, late Maj L Khiangte, who had been killed in action during the battle on the Sabuna Disty, while leading a valiant CA with his coy and some tks to try and evict the Pakis from their lodgement at Beriwala br.

A few months after I arrived at the Bn, late Lt Col S D Dasgupta took over the Bn. He really had his hands full with the maj inquiries that had been ordered by the G of I and the Army HQs. The Bn was still dply on the Sabuna Disty and after the Simla Agreement in Jul 72, had to move fwd to re-take the areas that had been secured by the Pakis during the war. We had to clear the area of mines while ensuring security under the direct obsn of the Paki posts on the border.

I was now a Maj and a coy cdr, along with Majs T K Bardhan, Martin Khongmen, Gurdip Singh and others. I heard the story of the battle first hand – an extremely painful experience. It was also a pd of digging up the remains of our dead, some of whom had been hurriedly buried on the Disty and ahead and then re-burying them at the designated site of the planned war memorial, particularly as orders had been received to improve the defs all over. This painful ex also involved receiving the nok of all our dead and completing the process with due mil honours in their presence. Sue’s family also came for the reburial and formal conduct of last rites with full mil honours for late Maj Khiangte, their son – I conducted them and looked after them to the best of my ability.

Unfortunately due to loss of territory and Pakistan taking some POWs the battle was treated as a defeat by the Govt and Army HQs at that time. The Bn therefore went through traumatic times as both the Govt and Army HQ ordered formal enquiries into the same. It is only from the latter half of 1973 that we had some respite from the inquiries – every man of the Bn had been interrogated during these enquiries! An extremely sad period!

In end 1973 I was sent to attend the JC Course, again at C of C Mhow. I learnt a lot and did well on the course. I was fortunate and received an instrs grading on the course. I then reverted to the Bn, all of whom were busy prep to mov by mil spec train to Misamari near Tezpur in Assam our next scheduled loc. We settled down here and started trg for ops in the mtns which was now our op role. Unfortunately after a mere four months in Misamari the Bn was ordered to mov to Ranchi mil spec train.

JC Wing C of C, Mhow

Immediately on reaching the Bn I received my posting as a DS at the JC Wing, C of C, Mhow. I then decided that this was the ideal time to appear for the DSSC Entrance Exam. Everyone told me that I did not have enough time to prep – I needed to do sustained study for at least one to two years. I had only two months till the exam – I took my annual leave at Mhow and prepared and studied hard for about two months and appeared for the exam in the end of 75. By about Mar 76 the results of Exam were announced. Much to my surprise, with God’s blessings, I had come first in the Army. I along with Maj Ram Subramanyam, Engrs was selected to attend the Scientific Orientation Course at the Royal Military College of Science at Shrivenham in the United Kingdom followed by the Royal Staff College at Camberly

The Scientific Orientation Course was three months duration and a research project was to be done by each of us for gradation. My project was on “Weather Warfare” – I received a “D” on the Scientific Orientation Course at Shrivenham. We then went onto Staff College Camberly for the Staff Course for 10 months. I was graded a ‘D’ (Distinguished) and Recommended to be a member of the DS at Camberly Staff College (the sec Indian to be so recommended since Indep) and graded as the best student offr on the entire course. This was comn to me personally by the VCOAS on my return to India. – he also placed the same on record to me through a DO letter communicated through my fmn Cdr.

On my return I was given comd – ‘C’ Coy. Lt Col S D Dasgupta was still the CO of the Bn – it was great to be back home amidst old friends – Martin Khongmen, Maj T K Bardhan, Bill Phillips, Gurdip, Kalia, Moni Kauchhur, Ken Gray and others. We were all then very busy on trg. In early Dec, Lt Col Dasgupta was posted out after a long and very hectic tenure and the new CO, Lt Col B K Khullar posted in. Christmas was celebrated at Ranchi with great gusto and we all enjoyed the celebrations. In Nov 78, we managed to celebrate the raising day properly with a great event of tribal dances, followed by dinner at the offr’s mess – we had invited all the VIPs at Ranchi and from the Army and the event went off wonderfully in typical Phantom Rhino (3 Assam) style.

Maintenance of Golf Courses and My Views

One evening in 78 I was called up by the CO and instr to take my coy out to the Div Golf Course at night and cut the grass there with the help of lt from petromaxes/lanterns as the Corps and Div Cdrs were coming to play golf the next day. I was most perturbed and flatly refused and told the CO that this was not our job! He told me off and warned me that not doing so would have repercussions. I stuck to my guns and refused to take the coy out for this task being illegal (as usual I was being the argumentative Bengali). The next morning I was told by the CO to dress in ceremonials and was marched up to the Bde Cdr, where I was asked why I had disobeyed the order. I told the Bde Cdr exactly what I told the CO and that the comd I had been given to cut grass at the golf course with my coy at night in this fashion was incorrect. The Bde Cdr knew I was right and I got off with being told off. I remembered this incident throughout my service and from the time I became a Bde Cdr onwards ensured that no mil manpower was ever deployed in my jurisdiction to do up golf courses for the entertainment of senior offrs – in fact I was so put off by the incident that I also totally stopped playing golf that I had just picked up!

In Jan 79, I proceeded to the C of C, Mhow to attend the SC Course, which was to prep offrs for comd of units. I did well on the course and again got an instrs grading. I returned to the unit in end Mar 79.

Jamdhedpur and Bhubaneswar

In Apr 79 the entire Bn was moved to Jamshedpur by rd for IS Duties related to quelling of riots. Our duties were fortunately ltd to standing bye and doing Flag Marches through Jamshedpur town. The Tata’s veh factory mgmt looked after us very well while were there and gave the entire Bn a tour around their complex. We then moved back to Ranchi.

No sooner than we got back, the Bn was mov emergently to Bhubaneswar by rd to quell a revolt by the CRPF at the Group Centre with two CRPF bns plus located there. We moved day and night and reached Bhubaneswar in two days. We mov straight into action after carrying out necessary recce of their loc – we then warned them on loudhailers of dire consequences if they did not put down their arms and surrender immediately. We had meanwhile surrounded their campus. We gave them the night to think it over – the next morning they came out with a white flag and surrendered and handed over their arms and the armoury. The CRPF big wigs had meanwhile arrived and took over the sit.

The State Govt requested us to stay on some time as standbye till they were satisfied that the sit was totally stable. They looked after us very well – our offr’s mess and offrs accn was loc at the lavish State Guest House and the men in the police barracks next door. During the period of two months there, we got our families over to Bhubaneswar and managed to take them sightseeing all over Orissa including to the famous Chilka Lake, Konarak Sun Temple, and its beaches and of course to Puri. We had then reverted to Ranchi in July 1979.

Move to Malari, Joshimath

In Jul 79 the Bn received orders to move to fd to the UP/ Tibet Border Sect – mov was scheduled for Sep 79. I was detailed as the Advance Party Cdr. I alongwith the adv party moved to Joshimath and Malari under 9 (I) Mtn Bde Gp under HQs CC. We mov by train and tpt to Joshimath, which was the Bde HQs and our Rear and commenced taking over. The Bde had different units guarding the Badrinath, the Harsil, Dharchula, Lipulekh and our Bn – the Malari and Barahoti sub sects. The entire 9 (I) Inf Bde Gp sect was well known as the ‘Valley of the Gods’.

Area familiarisation and taking over

I then proceeded with our teams to the locs where the Bn was to be dply to take over op tasks, arms, amn, stores, eqpt and accn – the Bn HQs group was at Malari feature at about 12000 feet (Malari is a village which is at the convergence of routes from, the famous and beautiful Barahoti plain (a valley on the Himalayan ridgeline and the LAC and the source of the River Girthi Ganga – claimed by China) and the Niti Pass (an old trade route to Tibet) which was at the hd waters of the River Dhauli Ganga. We in addn had posts dominating the Girthi Ganga valley route and at Barahoti and posts covering the Dhauli Ganga valley on the Niti Pass route (locs not given for security reasons). Malari used to be our rd hd and mov ahead to our fwd posts along AT cum ft trs.

River Girthi Ganga Valley

After starting taking over at Malari, I went fwd with my men along with a ptl of the outgoing Bn. We moved on ft up the Girthi Ganga Valley. I recollect vividly, passing a small stone altar on the edge of the cliff next to a lone root sticking out just below our ft tr – the root looked exactly like a striking cobra. As each man walked past the altar he on his own, picked a piece of shale from the tr and placed it on the altar as an offering to God to keep them safe from the elements – irrespective of their religion, everyone felt as if they were now God’s wards and under his safekeeping.

Patrolling in the Valley of the Gods – Barahoti

After reaching Barahoti, which still had plenty of snow, we had some food and rest. We were supposed to leave the post at 2 AM, a time when the snow was still firm and mov across the Barahoti valley to the LAC, to check on Chinese trp activity. At 1 AM I found everyone up and on their knees praying silently to their own respective Gods – we were all under his care and prayed to him as his wards for his protection – it was said that if you failed to do so, you would incur God’s wrath and ill would befall you. All of us actually felt very spiritual and close to the Almighty up there and as if we were in God’s presence. No wonder it is called ‘the Valley of the Gods!’

Rather than go back to Malari and then come back up the Dhauli Ganga Valley to Niti Pass, I decided that my men and I would traverse the Himalayan ridge line along the LAC – travel along it to Niti pass from Barahoti (at about 14000 feet) – a treck of about 20 kms traversing the 20000 feet high mtn range. Just before we left Barahoti we saw about 50 PLA soldiers also visit the LAC on horseback. It was a difficult treck – we ran into a blizzard while crossing the range but with God’s blessing passed safely across and by last lt just about managed to reach our fwd post covering the Niti Pass in the Dhauli Ganga Valley. The next morning we moved back along the track to Timarsen, next to Niti Village and our next post. We then completed our taking over tasks there and after a day’s halt proceeded back to the outgoing Bn’s HQs at Malari.  I then completed my taking over at the Bn HQs over the next few days.

There was an interesting incident I remember while at Malari. One morning I looked down from the Offr’s Mess where I was staying towards the ITBP Camp a couple of thousand feet below next to the Malari village. To my amazement I saw a large pahari black dog running ahead, closely followed by one of my boys running after it brandishing a Dah (a tribal sword and the regtl wpn) obviously planning to kill and the eat it (Black dogs are delicacy amongst some of our tribes) with the ITBP Insp brandishing a pistol and running after them – it was apparently his dog. Needless to say he could neither get back his dog nor catch my man! I thereafter had a difficult time mollifying him!

Part of my op familiarisation was also to visit the other bn sectors at Harsil, Badrinath and Dharchula (including Lipulekh Pass on the border). I duly did so. I did so by rd and the entire mov took me over two weeks. I was now in a posn to do the final supervision of my adv party’s final taking over. I also had to make arngs to receive my Bn as it came in – it was now Sep 79. I oversaw the Bn’s arr and mov to all the above locs – it was good to see them again and to be able to pass on my responsibility to them. Having done so I again took charge of my Coy at Timarsen on the Dhauli Ganga – the CO had put me in charge of looking after the Dhauli Ganga axis. After some time 2^nd Lt Subrata Saha  was posted in as my coy offr.

The Malari tenure was extremely satisfying – it was purely professional duties in the fd. There was another very interesting incident in this great Valley of the Gods which took place in my sub sect and in front of me.

I continued serving as the coy cdr at that loc in 1980, interspersed with fd firing and collective trg. I was also required to write an ex for the Bde.

Raising 9 Assam

In early Jun I was informed that I had been approved for promotion as Lt Col and that I was to mov immediately and raise a new bn of the Regt – 9 Assam at Shillong. I was then dined out of the Bn with much good wishes at Malari and moved to ARC Shillong in early Jul 80. I met the Comdt, then Brig V S Bajwa, who went out of way to help us in the raising. We were also given a lot of help by the 5/8 GTC also at Happy Valley, Shillong. Our raising was to be under HQs 101 Comn Z Area my old HQs. Our raising was to commence on 1 Aug 80 and was to be completed in six months.

We were posted a wonderful group of firebrands and in some cases totally ‘mad cap’ offrs who were capable of wonders, as well as some excellent JCOs including my SM, late Honorary Capt Asuli Mao. The raising was celebrated with a flag hoisting at the QG, a Sainik Sammelan, Church and Mandir, tea and a cake cutting. The raising nucleus was 7 offrs, 7 JCOsand 54 ORs. All serving and retd offrs and JCOs of the Regt were invited to the function.

As with all new raisings, we had to start from scratch with no money or resources and were dependant on the supply of items, as per our inventory received from various deps. While the quality of men was generally good, we received a fair share of trouble makers.  I am afraid that we were fairly ruthless in relation to bad hats – rather than send them back to their bns, those who we just could not bring under control, were sent home.

We concentrated on trg – initially indl and then coy/bn level, conc on the likely new op role. We also had to equip the bn and finish adm, incl docu, to set our house in order and to complete the raising in the allocated period of six months. There were no frills or red carpets. We did however have a great time and intermingled socially quite frequently.

The Bn was visited by a number of senior offrs, the COR and all CO and SM during the Biennial Conf and by GOC 101 Comn Z Area. In Dec we had our first Annual Insp by GOC 101 Comn Z Area – as part of the insp we carried out a ceremonial parade for him to inspect. He then visited our sub unit and indl trg. We were then declared ‘Fit for War and fully raised’.

Some of the Offrs who were part of our raising team were Late Lt Col S B Rai (the 2IC), then Majs/Capts/ Lts A G Datar, Maj Rai Singh, Chandra Shekharan Nair, Shashi Bhushan, W A Donoghue, Jasbir Singh Bawa, Bhim Anal, Suresh Ghorpade, Mani Ram, Arun Ahuja, A K Singh, Sree Ramulu, G Nagaraj, V K Sharma, Pradip Vij, Bipin Bhalla, Arun Ahuja, Nandraj Lama,  K K Raheja (Our doctor), Nirmal Singh (of the General Service and our QM). Also, Arun Harge, late U P S Jassal, Ashok Malhotra, B K Nair, Shanta Kumaran, Sudhendra Singh, Sujit Maini, Muralidhar Kutty, M R Pankaj,  Omesh Madan, and Sanjeev Shenoy (all of who joined later) – with my fading memory I hope I am not missing out anyone – I could not have had a better team of offrs. I however cannot help but say that, we all built up such tremendous espirite – de – corps and camaraderie that we would all go out of our way to help each other even today.

Mov to Madekata and Trg

By Dec, we had recd our mov orders for Dehra Dun in early February. We therefore started plg for the mov. It was essential that we complete our fd firing and battle inoculation and some op oriented trg, prior to the mov. I had checked with the Area HQs, who advised us that we would have to mov in batches spread over a pd, as adequate tpt was not available to mov us in one go. Even though our Canteen was doing well and was generating some profit, we were woefully short of regtl funds to create property for the various institutions of the Bn. We decided to leave Shillong on foot through the Meghalaya forests immediately after New Year 1981. We would take a permit from the forest auth to cut adequate cane, bamboo and wood to be able to constr furniture for the institutes on reaching the new loc. Then, this would be loaded up into our empty tpt and moved to a preselected camp site at a place called Madekata near Rangiya, which was our entraining stn for the mov.

The bn would meanwhile continue on to the fd firing ranges which were also close to the camp site on the Bhutan border. All went according to plan. We walked, (inspite of everyone saying we were mad!) cut adequate cane, bamboo and furniture wood, went on for field firing (which was carried out with aplomb) and then moved to Madekata, an old fort with a moat around it, which was ideal for conducting attacks across a linear obstacle. The Area Cdr visited us both at the ranges and during collective trg and once again pronounced us fit for war on completion of our raising. It is then that our luck started failing us.

Pregnant Families

Firstly, our train was delayed by no less than a month and a half. We were therefore stuck in a tented camp on the banks of the River Puthimari close to Rangiya, seemingly having a picnic! We therefore decided that we would commence full scale indl and sub unit trg. We had, before leaving Shillong, passed very clear orders that NO pregnant families were to accompany us on the journey – they were to mov direct to Dehra Dun. Unfortunately the Coy Cdrs did not enforce these orders rigidly enough. Apparently, Shillong had been a very fertile tenure! My RMO came running to me in late Jan saying that we had 35 ladies in adv stages of pregnancy with us on the banks of the Puthimari!

Basically, the wives had refused to listen to their husbands, whom they had threatened and disobeyed, and had surreptitiously come in the veh colns. This is typical of our Regt! We then spent the next month and a half tearing our hair out hoping that the babies were delivered safely. We managed to deliver 21 babies on the River bank/Rangiya Fd Hosp and one prematurely on the spec train when travelling to Dehra Dun! Finally, we managed to leave Madekata and reach Dehra Dun!

Dehra Dun

Dehra Dun was an eventful tenure for the bn. We settled down quickly. We put a team into posn to adorn our lines and the Messes with bamboo gates and gazebos, make cane furniture for the institutes and sent off our wood to Saharanpur for constr of wooden furniture for the Messes, Church, Mandir, Offices and so on at a ridiculously low cost. In a couple of months, we had created almost as much infrastructure as an old bn would have. We also had ample opportunity to conduct collective trg at all levels, with particular emphasis on aslt across single and double linear obstacle systems, watermanship and fd firing. The bn did splendidly and earned a very good reputation.

We still had a few bad hats who created problems intermittently. We had a Sikh Arty unit as our neighbour and their bad hats and ours invariably caused trouble on Sat evenings after the rum was issued. The only offrs staying close to the unit lines were their CO and I – we were both sqn mates from the NDA. Therefore on Sat nis we were both always on stand to – either he would be informed of a fracas or I would and we would both then rush out to get the sit under cont; this was again quite normal in the Regt. 

Motivation of GCs

The IMA was next door. Thus, in consultation with their pl cdrs, we would call selected GCs (those who were doing well) over to the bn to a number of our events including tribal dances and put them through the paces of motivation, so that they would opt for the ASSAM Regt and 9 ASSAM in particular.

Ex the Gaon Bura’s Powers

We had a Paite Nb Sub Adjt with a young and pretty wife. We also had a handsome, very smart and well-built Rengma RP Hav. I got to know through my wife’s circles that they were having an affair and that there was criticism of this behaviour among the families because the two were from totally different tribes and the woman was married. I then called my SM Asuli and asked him to investigate immediately. The next morning he confirmed the rumours to be true. We decided to post them out in opposite directions – they were to be escorted to the train that very ni to nip the problem in the bud.

At 2 AM, I received an urgent call from the duty clerk, asking me to come to the office imdtly. On my asking why, he said, “Sahib the Nb Sub Adjt’s wife came quietly at night, opened your office, pulled out your chair, put it under the branch of the 200 year old Banyan tree overhanging your door, stood on it and put a noose around her neck. She then started screaming loudly to call the CO imdtly or she would commit suicide.”

I immediately rushed to the office, sent for the Adjt and the 2IC who lived 6 km away and called for the SM and dutyJCO. I then tried my best to coax this lady to get down. By this time, all had arrived and a large part of the bn had reached the place to watch the drama being enacted. She stated that she would get down only if I listened to and accepted her demands. She said, “My husband is an old man who does not satisfy me sexually – he is useless and I do not love him. The RP Hav is a good man and I love him. Please divorce me from my husband immediately under tribal law as the Gaon Bura and send him off to the ARC alone – do not post out the RP Hav or take any action against him.”

The 2IC, SM and I contd the negotiations for about three hours. Finally, I agreed to a partial deal – I would use my tribal powers as a Gaon Bura, under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution and the relevant Act and divorce them – she and the RP Hav must imdtly go on leave together and never come back, failing which disciplinary action would be initiated. The Nb Sub Adjt was sent off to ARC, much to the consternation of then Comdt – who justifiably fired me up! Unfortunately, the girl deserted the RP Hav within a week and he came back to the unit. Disc action was then initiated. It was a very interesting incident, revealing the actual tribal powers of a CO in those days.

24 Inf Div

In late 82, I received my posting with orders to proceed forthwith to Bikaner and be part of the raising team of HQs 24 Inf Div, as the GSO 1 (Ops) – that was to be expected as I had not done a staff apmt on my return from Camberly. There was no time for a proper dining out as we were in the midst of a Bn Ex – had to request my 2IC to take over. 9 Assam therefore to date owes me a Dining Out from the Offr’s Mess. Being a new raising it was almost as bad as being back to rum boxes again. We were however able to muscle in and get some accn and furniture at Bikaner for the new Div HQs.

In the ops branch I got busy opening files on all op matters and edn of my staff. We had to take over the op area, set up the ops cum sand model room and also set up the Tac HQs complete set up – my experience of creating a Tac HQs for 101 Comn Z Area and raising of 9 Assam coupled with the trg at Camberly stood me in good stead. Within a short time we were fully functional as an eff Div HQ. After completion of raising we moved out on our first test ex – acting as enemy to an offensive Corps while testing the concept of nodal point def, in the deserts of Rajasthan near Bikaner. Interestingly during the exercise we bumped into 9 Assam who formed part of the ex en and had tea and samosas together! We all did well on the ex and our GOC was complimented on the performance of the HQs.

Higher Air Command (HAC) Course at Secunderabad

Shortly following the ex, I was again posted out to attend the HAC at Secunderabad at the IAF CAW. As I was the first Army offr to ever attend the HAC Course, I was instr to first report to MT Dte Gen and the MS Branch at AHQs for a briefing. I was also to be interviewed by the COAS which was quite unusual. When I was interviewed by all and sundry I was told that the COAS had personally selected me from the merit list of offrs for HC Courses being the first in the order of merit and that he had done so to set an example by sending the Army’s topmost offr for this Course. I was thus unable to protest or argue the decision. The course was an education and I did well – however during the Course sadly my wife Sue died.

IATT Botswana, Africa

Straight after the Course I was selected and posted as the CO of the IATT at Botswana, Africa with a task of trg and helping the Botswana Govt to raise a small Army – the ‘Botswana Defence Force (BDF)’. I was the sec CO of the IATT and we did well and raised the BDF which was about equivalent in size to a Bde Gp.

The people in Botswana were wonderful – in many ways similar to the tribal boys in my Assam Regt from the NE. They were strong, tough, simple, happy go lucky folk with no airs. I vividly remember during one of my visits to the Wg at Francistown, I dropped in unannounced at the COs office. It was the beginning of the month. The CO had his legs up on his table with two dozen cans of beer in front of him along with a huge plate of Millie (maize) meal and red cabbage. He had a huge roasted thigh of beef in his hand and he was eating and drinking to his heart’s content. My coming didn’t bother him – he simply waved the thigh in my face and offered me a bite! That was what my boys would have also done in those days! He would then be broke by the 7^th of the month having blown all his money on wine, women and food. The society was very free but tribal in character. If you left your wife and took off with someone else, tribal laws dictated you must continue to care for both the old wife and her off springs from you and so on.

My tenure with the BDF passed speedily – they were very happy with me and got my tenure extended by six months by the Indian Govt – they even suggested I resign from the IA and that they would recruit me into the BDF as one of their hierarchy of mil advisors on a substantial salary – I declined. Notwithstanding that it was soon time to return to India in 86, after a wonderful tenure in a wonderful country. I had received my promotion cum posting order as a Col in 86 as the CO of 4 Assam at Barrackpore.

Period with 4 Assam

              When I reached 4 Assam loc at Barrackpore in 1986, I found that only their Rear party was there – the bn had gone on collective trg to Sikkim and was to return after a week. I was however told that the CO was admitted in the hosp at Barrackpore – I could meet him if I wanted and the Bde Cdr and his staff. I met the Cdr and was advised to wait for the Bn to return as it would easily take me a week to reach them. I did so and met the Bde staff and Col Shahi, the CO of 4 Assam, who I was supposed to relieve. He was an inter Regimental transferee from the Sikh Regt and had been posted to 4 Assam as CO. I had inadvertently learnt from the JCO IC of the Rear Party that Col Shahi had been beaten up by the Bn offrs for talking against 4 Assam and the people of the NE and was disliked by all ranks intensely. That was how he had been admitted to the hosp – the Bde HQs had been told that he had been beaten by some civs and that an inquiry was in progress.

MS Br

I was attached formally to the Bde HQs till return of the Bn. However within two days, my posting as CO was held in abeyance by MS Br. A day before the Bn was to return I received a cancellation of the posting and a new set of orders posting me forthwith to MS Br Army HQs as Col MS 1. MS 1 was the sec of MS Br that controlled all offrs postings upto the rank of Col on Staff and ERE at various HQs of the IA. Col MS 1 was therefore considered to be one of the most coveted appts for a Col in the Army.

The marraige

In the latter half of 1987 my late wife Sue’s relative Linda I decided to get married. The sr offrs of my Regt were also pressurizing me to marry again. My boss, Brig Cardozo and his wife were also very happy with the idea. We decided on the marriage in Delhi. It was quite difficult to get married at short notice – everyone refused to marry us! We tried to get consent of the Church and get married there but they refused saying they must have minimum 30 days for the bans. We then tried the civil court – they also demanded 30 days – we had only two weeks. I therefore spoke to the three Assam Bns located close around Delhi asking for their pastor to marry us! 3 Assam consented to send the Pastor Rev (Sub) Kungliana and the SM Pasena to marry us! Mr Lalthanhawla, the former Chief Minister of Mizoram and his wife (Linda’s Aunt) kindly consented to come for the wedding, which was to be at my place at SP Marg. Maj V K Sharma agreed to be my Best Man. The wedding was on 27 Feb 88 and was attended by all my offrs and Brig Cardozo and all their wives and Col Ruata and his family. The wedding went off well, after which we had a high tea and cocktails. As everything had to be done by yours truly there were quite a number of flaps, but everything finally all worked out.

ARC and 5 Assam

In 88, there was a serious problem in 5 Assam between some of the offrs and the JCOs and men which necessitated an immediate change of the CO who had also developed a heart problem. The COR, Lt Gen S K Pillai, then requested me to find an experienced CO to post to 5 Assam poste haste – I requested all the COs who were about to complete their tenure/those who had completed the same to go for a sec comd to 5 Assam – knowing the problem there, they all refused. I then told Gen Pillai that I would go even though I had not completed my tenure in MS Br. My offrs and Brig Cardozo strongly advised against it but I insisted for the sake of my Regt.

I then told Gen Pillai that before joining 5 Assam I needed a few months at the ARC, as I had just got married and needed to settle Linda and the kids, before rushing off to a difficult and challenging fd posting with 5 Assam at Mechuka in Arunachal. Both he and my colleagues in MS Br agreed – so off I went as the Trg Bn Cdr at the ARC for a d of three months.

              The Comdt ARC was Brig Prakash Shivpuri and his wife Veena – both of them wonderful people – Brig Shivpuri was an extremely competent soldier, an excellent Comdt and a diehard Rhino as we were all called. He was from 1 Assam, comd 4 Assam and had raised and comd 7 Assam. One could not have a better choice as the Comdt. Brig Shivpuri and Lt Gen S K Pillai as the COR were a winning combination and they did the Regt proud. Late Col L C Sailo was the Dy Comdt – he was a course sr to me – we got on extremely well together. The ARC was responsible for selecting the raw material and trg these new rects for the Bns and laying down policy for the adm of the Regt in consultation with the COR and were doing a wonderful job – I had been posted as the Trg Bn Cdr responsible for the trg of the rects. Even though I was not to be at ARC for long, I did my utmost to ensure we trained them properly. We all therefore remained very busy.

After two months at the ARC I received my posting as 5 Assam – to move in a month. I therefore applied for and got SF accn next to Lady Keane College in Shillong Cantt and shifted in there. I had my Volkswagen and moved to ARC and back the rest of my tenure on the same.

After exactly three months at the ARC in 88, I set off after being dined out to take over 5 Assam which had just moved to Mechuka. I was required to start my journey at 5 Assam Rear at the Jorhat Airforce Stn and according mov by my car from Shillong to the 5 Assam Rear. 5 ASSAM’s Mechuka tenure is full of worthwhile lessons and hence must be related primarily on account of the degree of difficulty the Bn had to operate under.  At that time the Eastern LAC/Macmohan Line was still hot following the Sumdorong Chu and Bisa Cane Bridge incidents of 1986 – 87. The Bde was responsible for the Subansiri River Valley (Tamechung Chung, Asafila and Bisa Cane Bridge), Mechuka and the Siyom River Valley, Manigong and the Tuting – Siang River Valley sectors. CO 5 ASSAM was the Grn Cdr of Mechuka sector, which incl two coys of JATs, two coys AR, one fd bty, one fd coy engrs, necessary comns, ASC, EME, AMC dets under comd, and that the grn must cover the dply of the rest of the bde should the need arise.

5 ASSAM was also to maint tps in readiness to rft the other Valleys if required. All three Valleys were completely air maint and had been occupied only in 87. We were also required to visit the other two valleys and carry out op familiarisation so as to be in op readiness at all times. In addn the grn had to simultaneously constr permt def under Op Falcon for the Mechuka sector. This was a daunting task in itself. Def stores would be flown in, which would then be manpacked by the grn to the respective loc and then the def would be constr. This meant manpacking SRTs, CGI sheets, ballis, AI pkts, PBS rolls and so on uphill over distances extending upto 70 kms. All existing def were to be totally re-sited based on revised op plans. Wooden op hut type living accn and storage sheds were also to be constr at Mechuka for a Bn HQs and two coys for R & R, as well as at all op bases.

I decided to take the ft route and marched up the 110 kms, with the escort the Bn sent me – the route was in fact extremely bad and at places passed through streams which were in spate.. I also stopped over with the men and slept overnight in villages enroute. Notwithstanding the difficult route we moved fast and reached Mechuka in 3 days travelling about 40 kms a day in extremely rugged hilly terrain much to everyone consternation!

Dply

Only the Bn Adm element and the Rear were loc at Mechuka next to the ALG, (which was under repair and extension initially when the bn arrived), and there were to be no flights for another two months. The Bn was spread out across the region with the Bn HQs and B Coy located at Tongkorla, (a feature about 10 kms North of Mechuka), C Coy at Pt 2522, (a site of a battle with the Chinese in 62), D Coy at Changkarla. The fourth Coy, while temporarily on various adm tasks was to dply to a fwd post at Yorlung (screen and about 30 kms ahead of Pt 2522), which was then held by a reinforced pl of AR. Another fwd post existed at Lamang (10 kms from the Eastern LAC/Macmohan Line at Lola Pass and 15 kms North of Yorlung), again held by a reinforced pl of AR. Both Yorlung and Lamang were the operating bases, for all the patrols that we had to keep sending up to the Eastern LAC.

JCOs IC and Their tasks

The bn was posted only 5 offrs and one more was due to be posted out. In view of the prevailing sit in the Bn, the requirement was to reduce the dependency on offrs, put JCOs in charge at all possible locs and make them accountable; and feel that they had our trust. The first priority was to conduct op familiarisation, rehash and re-site defences and dply the troops accordingly – literally by yesterday.

Domination of the Eastern LAC was as high a priority, as the Chinese just did not hesitate to try and intrude wherever they could. The constr of adm bases at Mechuka (the place was like a funnel channelling the extremely cold wind at high speed through our camp sites) and all op locs with civ help; a class op 5 tr from Mechuka ALG to the base of Pt 2522 and, a suspension br across the Yargyap Chu River (to sustain Tonkhorla and Changkarla, that were impossible to reach when the river was in spate – which was most of the time), were also very high priority tasks.

Moreover apart from men being on leave or courses, we had no less than 100 men in 16 adm dets scattered enroute. The Bn was also required to ensure the same activity for 8 JATs and the AR, who were dply at features adjacent to Mechuka and provided protection of the Air Hd. Everyone in the Bn was hard pressed. However, within six months the Battalion had the class 5 op tr to Tongkhorla base and the suspension br ready, which eased lgs tremendously. The Bn also managed to build some covered accn for the men and our stores at all locs.

Simultaneously, def re-sited and dug and the men started man packing the air dropped def stores forward to all locs. The constr would continue throughout the Bn’s tenure there. There was hence a great deal of delegation which paid off, particularly with the JCOs being given more responsibility. The offrs could thus devote much more time to planning and supervisory functions.

I used to visit the coys every day travelling cross country across the hills and land up at the posts without warning to make sure all was well – I invariably clocked between 15 to 20 kms up and down hill a day in very difficult terrain. The bn’s efforts to make the JCOs more responsible and accountable were a great success and it is good to see that 5 ASSAM has continued with this practice. Thanks to all of our conjt efforts we managed to resolve problems in the Bn and remould it into the excellent fighting team that it was earlier.

LRP by our YOs

 Two YOs had just joined the Bn – it was Dec and bitterly cold. We decided to send both of them together on an LRP to the Eastern LAC passes along with a pl. It was a 10 day ptl as per the pgme issued by higher HQs and they left just before Christmas. On the second day, they reached the first pass and then moved on to the sec. Meanwhile, it was Christmas Day and the rest of us were at the cake cutting celebrations at the adm base.

Early that morning, they reported Chinese PLA activity at the pass and that the Chinese had not seen them dply defiladed behind one shoulder. They were advised to simply remain concealed and observe the PLA activity. When the Chinese ptl of about 50 men withdrew after a halt of about two h, these two young men – on their own initiative decided to follow them all the way upto the Chinese post, some 10 kms across theLAC! At some point they were detected. The Chinese version that was later deciphered from the PLA comns was that our boys had fired on the PLA! However, the Chinese had come up onto the Bn radio net and on their own nets and were passing orders to cut the ptl off and to block them from getting back across the LAC. The Bn imdtly ordered men fwd, to secure their line of retreat. Fortunately, there were another two strong ptls close to the area. They were finally extracted late that night. Our Christmas celebrations therefore passed, with the bn having to contend with the vagaries of our extra adventurous and exhuberant youngsters!

Making of Christmas Cake

              Up at Mechuka there were no bakeries or any means of getting hold of Christmas Cake – I therefore decided to take on the responsibility of baking cake for the entire Bn. We got seven empty 200 litre barrels which had been used at the ALG and half bury them in the ground with space to light a fire underneath to act as ovens. We had been stocked with our HAA rations which included lots of dry fruits’. We demanded the rind of the oranges and lemons that had gone to the Coys as part of their rations. We had plenty of Flour, Eggs, Sugar and baking powder/soda as part of our rations. I then got hold of 10 men and an offr, JCO and an NCO, nominated them as assist chefs and got down to baking some 100 kgs of Christmas cake. It was quite a sight watching all of us mixing the cake and beating the eggs in huge utensils and kneeding the dough with our feet. We had got hold of utensils from all coys poured the batter into them and then baked on Christmas Eve – we then had the CO’s own Christmas Cake to serve everyone on Christmas day.

HQ Coy Cdr’s Trousers

              One of offr’s was a proper ladies man. We happened to have a girl’s hostel and college in Mechuka vill which was also the Circle HQs. One fine morning while walking through the vill with the SM, to our horror we saw this offr running very fast towards the unit without his pants with about 10 to 12 men running after him with dahs and waving his pants – we later got to know that his pants had got stuck and been torn off on a window sill when he was trying to escape from a girls hostel room. We then had quite a problem cooling local tempers over the incident!

Nothing Heard

              Mechuka was loc 110 kms walking distance from the Bde HQs at Along, consequently unless a heptr or fixed wing sortie was available no one would visit us. Our telephonic and radio comns to the HQs were also quite indifferent. The Bde Cdr was also only three months sr to me. Consequently sometimes when there were unpleasant issues being communicated we were in a posn to say “Nothing Heard” on tele/radio. The Bde HQs accepted this sit most of the time because of our difficult circumstance and the fact that I happened to be the senior most CO in the entire Army by the end of my tenure with 5 Assam and only three months jr to the Bde  Cdr.

One day when flts were through, my nominated staff had by oversight overloaded a returning AN 32 ac – only one ton load was permitted on return from Mechuka. The IAF made an issue of it and demanded responsible be punished. I then took full responsibility for the incident because it had been done inadvertently by my offrs and men – I was later issued a written warning.

165 Mtn Bde

In early 90, I was extremely lucky to be posted to 165 Mtn Bde on promotion. Our ERE was from the ASSAM Regt and from the three bns that I had served with. I was also extremely lucky to have 7 ASSAM under my comd and was able to take them under my wing. Unfortunately 7 Assam had a trouble maker as the sr coy cdr and both the CO and the 2IC had just arrived from other Regts. I hence had to keep a close watch on the Bn to prevent the CO and the 2IC from being harassed on the instigation of this offr.

A few months after taking over, the entire 20 Mtn Div less our Bde moved west as there was a possibility of another war with Pak.  Our Bde was left behind for the def of Bhutan. During the first two months, we were therefore busy recce and making revised plans for the def of Bhutan with one Bde only. I was also looking after the entire Binnaguri Stn.

Once we completed reviewing our Bhutan task we were instructed to move West forthwith for ops against Pak. I was ordered to mov ahead with my Recce Gp.  I was told to fly to Srinagar and that the Bde would follow. When I reported to HQs 15 Corps I was told that they knew nothing of my coming and that I better check with the MO Dir at Army HQs. I immediately did so and was told to mov to Bikaner, Rajasthan. I reached there and was again told – ‘wrong place’ – I was told to mov to Pathankot/Gurdaspur – I reached there and we were finally told and got dply at Amritsar, Khasa Camp after 14 days where we finally rejoined the Div! In fact as I reached Amritsar I received the first spec train of my Bde just chugging in.

We immediately got down to op trg as we were told to be ready to lead the Div’s offensive into Pak very shortly. I had put 7 Assam in the van. We remained on a high state of readiness; however, the ops were called off six hours before the H hr. We thereafter contd to be on standby at the same loc. This ex familiarised me with the entire Amritsar – Lahore sector and the pattern of ops required to be conducted in case of an offensive into Pak in this sect.

We thereafter, became involved in the ops to sp the Punjab police in quelling the Sikh extremists. 7 ASSAM did extremely well.

After seven months at Amritsar, the Bde mov back to Binaguri, but soon redply some elements to Nalbari (Assam) for Op Bajrang against the ULFA. It was now end  90.

After three months of ops there, the entire Bde redply along the North Bengal Bhutan border – ostensibly in the garb of doing sub unit collective trg, in view of the Bhopali crisis in South Bhutan. We then carried out ptl of the area to prevent the Bhopalis from setting up any camps/ sanctuaries to strike at Bhutan. This op totally familiarised me with Bhutan’s Southern border and stood me in good stead later for conducting border sealing ops against IIGs op in Bhutan in 2002.

My tenure with 165 Mtn Bde had by then drawn to an end. I had learnt a lot during this tenure which incl the def of Bhutan, plg an offensive op as part of the Div into Pak, CI ops under Op Bajrang in Lower Assam, counter Bhopali and border sealing ops related to South Bhutan and finally how to comd a military stn under difficult circumstances.

D & V Dte

I was then posted as DDG D & V (A) at D & V Dte at Army HQs in early 92. As DDG, D & V (A) I was in charge of monitoring and processing all disc and vig case related to all offrs of in the entire Army.  This tenure was extremely interesting and educative as it encompassed various legal aspects of the functioning of the IA and was something I had never done before. It involved monitoring of the state of disc amongst offrs, vigilance on their conduct in serious cases and where necessary their prosecution incl that of sr offrs of the Army.

While DDG I remember being directed to personally investigate accusations against a Corps Cdr for extensive corruption. A C of I had been ordered in which attempts had been made to hush up the case. I carried out my investigation much to the annoyance of the Comd and Corps HQs involved and concluded that the allegations were correct – the report was then forwarded to my superior for orders – I had recommended dismissal from service under Sec 18 of the AA. The case was mov totally by hand and approved by all qrs within 48 h – he was to be dismissed immediately.

I was imdtly tgt as I had come from that Comd to D & V Dte and my ACR was due. I was given a luke warm ACR by my erstwhile superiors with a view to prevent my further promotion. I was very upset and immediately appealed against the same – I was very fortunate that the system fully supported me incl all my superiors, the AG and the COAS. The ACR was quashed. I must also put on record that I was very fortunate – in most other cases it is never set aside as was done for me. Incidentally I must also pt out that I had got into trouble at all rks – maj, Lt Col, Col, Brig, Maj Gen and Lt Gen for doing something I had done as per my conscience which did not meet the approval of my superiors – I was always very fortunate till I reached the rank of Lt Gen – but more about that later. On reflection I remain very surprised as how I reached the rank of Lt Gen in spite of my outspokenness!

I did also personally investigate a number of other cases but that is not the aim of this book and must be put aside for posterity. In my experience as DDG D & V (A) the max number of offrs disciplinary cases were related to white collared crimes and were in the great maj by those who had opportunity – the ASC,  AOC, to a lesser degree the EME, AR and some sr offrs. One would rarely find jr offrs or offrs from the combat arms so involved primarily due to a lack of opportunity.

I must also relate the case of one of my Bns – 1 Assam which had gone on a UN msn to Cambodia. They had somehow picked up a very large number of HIV Aids cases and there was a strong demand for punitive action against the Bn by the hierarchy including the Govt. The Govt had also blocked payment of allowances to the Bn which was also being agitated against by some of them. The AG was directed to go to Cambodia to investigate – he decided to take me with him to do the grnd level investigation. I did a truthful investigation and managed to get the Bn off the hook with the support of the AG. I felt very good about my actions as it would have been very unjust to blame the entire Bn just because of a few bad hats. In fact the UNs Force Cdr, Gen Sanderson (who had been my DS at Camberly and with whom I had a personal equation) and the Bde and Div Cdr were very happy with the performance of 1 Assam and had given them letters of commendation.

After this extremely satisfying tenure I was nominated by the Army HQs to attend the NDC. I was also extremely fortunate in being awarded a Chief of Army Staff’s Commendation Card for my work as the DDG D & V (A).

NDC & BGS 4 Corps

After NDC I was posted as the BGS at HQs 4 Corps in 1995 – 96. In 4 Corps this meant dealing with all op matters pertaining to the Chinese PLA in Tibet and own troops actions in the entire Arunachal Pradesh. The BGS also monitored all CI ops in the state of Assam and Arunachal. It was a high profile job and very busy. Here also I was fortunate in that the HQs 4 Corps Camp and its Def and Emp Coy were from my Regt.

While at HQs 4 Corps I learnt a tremendous amount about the region, the op plans and functioning, which was to stand me in extremely good stead for my next appt as GOC 2 Mtn Div. I travelled extensively and frequently all over the Corps Z alongwith the GOC who trusted me implicitly and took me into his confidence. I got to delve into CI ops in great detail incl study of the different insurgent gps and their pattern of functioning. The most important lesson I learnt was the imp of int and pin point ops particularly as we had so few boots on the ground and to avoid harrassment of the local pop – I applied all these ideas as a GOC 15 Corps later on.

              As a large percentage of my Regt’s men were from Assam and Arunachal, I was able to go out of my way to look after them and to get their perspective on the CI Ops by the security forces and give a feed back on the same to the Corps and Div Cdrs – this resulted I am sure in the operations becoming more humane.

GOC 2 Mtn Div

I was meanwhile posted to Dinjan on promotion as GOC 2 Mtn Div. I was extremely busy at Dinjan – 2 Mtn Div was op responsible of the entire Arunachal Pradesh excluding the Tawang Sector, for ops on the Tibetan border. They were also incharge of the Tirap, Changlang and Lohit Districts of Arunachal Pradesh, the whole of Upper Assam and South Assam including Karbi Anglong and South Cachar Hills for CI ops against the ULFA, NDFB, DHD, KLNCHLF, KNA,NSCN (I & M),NSCN (K) and a few minor other insurgent groups, and had six Bdes dply for these ops. The area was vast, rugged, and hilly in most parts, heavily forested and sparsely populated – larger than the whole of J & K. I was therefore out visiting my tps and guiding ops every day.

I was now comdg tps in the same areas I had looked after when I was the Mechuka Grn Cdr (Siyom, Siang, Subansiri Valleys) and in addition now, the Dibang and Lohit Valleys including the Walong and Kibittu Sects, which were the sites of great battles in 1962 against the Chinese.

It was essential I visit the tps manning the Eastern LAC fairly often and see the sit and their preparedness for myself and attend to their well being. I therefore did so either by rd or by heptr. It was essential to understand that my HQs was at Dinjan near Dibrugarh and that in no case was any of six Bn HQs and the two fwd Bde HQs looking after the Eastern LAC closer than 200 to 300 kms and involved crossing the River Brahmaputra by ferry which at times took four to five h – or by elephant if going towards Tezu – I was thus continuously on the mov every day. However by doing so I was able to monitor the sit in the Div very closely during my tenure.

During such visits I had two mishaps and was lucky to escape alive. On the first occasion, while visiting one of our posts by hepr at a place called Tamechungchung in the Subansiri Valley (a very mountainous area), just after taking off, the heptr engine cut off at an alt of about 100 ft above the helipad – fortunately we had an excellent pilot and he managed to glide back to the helipad and crash land. The heptr was a total write off but we escaped with cuts and bruises! We then mustered tpt at the road head some distance away and walked cum drove back.

On another occasion during the monsoon I was driving in pouring rain along with my escorts early morning from Dinjan towards Jorhat in Assam. About halfway, we drove through a large patch of oil slick on the rd – some tanker must have leaked it onto the rd earlier that ni. Our entire cvy of six vehs travelling at only 60 kmph just slid off the rd due to the slick – the rd was on an embankment about 8 to 10 ft high and all six vehicles turned turtle on the adjacent fd. We were again cut and bruised but alive and kicking, though the vehs were fairly badly damaged. We then called forward some more tpt on radio and carried on with our travel plan.

CI Ops

One day I was visiting a Bn at Lekhapani in Upper Assam and after my visit was having lunch with them. I asked the CO if any ptl or sub unit had gone to Lakhipather, a notorious insurgent sympathising village in the centre of dense forest – he confirmed they had. I told him to warn them imdtly to be careful, as I had a sixth sense that they may be ambushed. He did so on radio imdtly. As I was leaving I was informed that the ptl had been ambushed by the ULFA and had suffered some casualties, but had fought their way out to safety carrying their dead and wounded with them. I was sad, but also gratified that my warning had been of some use.

Raid on Lal Pahar

              One day two suspicious looking men were spotted on a MC by a CP – when called upon to stop they tried to speed away. They were then fired upon and killed. On being searched, some wpns and incriminating docus were found and a roll of unprocessed film. I ordered processing of the film and was then shown the prints. It showed these two men posing with their wps at a camp site which had a huge distinctive cliff in the background.

I put my men on the job to try and loc the camp. Two months passed with no luck. Finally one fine day when I was visiting one of my Bdes by heptr I saw the cliff it was only a few kms away from Lohitpur which was the Bde HQs I had just visited. I then put them onto conducting raiding the camp – it was a very large ULFA camp and extremely well sited on high ground, with excellent fds of fire, yet covered by forest. The Bde managed to bust the camp but unfortunately the insurgents escaped.

Raid on NSCN (I & M) Council HQs

              I recollect the largest and most imp raid that had been conducted in my Div sect by yours truly, personally, as it was extremely successful and forced the NSCN (I & M) to sue for peace, a CF and talks with the G of I. One day I was told that a retd Hav of my Regt had come to meet me. I met him and found that it was Hav Ngamneithang who had been my dvr as a CO.  He had come with info of a very large NSCN (I & M) camp deep in the forest at the junc of Karbianglong, NC Hills and Nagaland. At that time the Nagas and Kukis were engaging in bitter feuding amongst themselves and a lot of people amongst both gps had been killed, including my former dvr’s brother – he wanted revenge on them for killing his brother.

I did not at that time know that the camp was that of the NSCN ( I & M) Council HQ where both Muivah and Isaac Swu, their ldrs were then loc. I put other sources on the job to confirm the info – it was confirmed. Ngamneithang had promised Kuki guides to take us cross country through the dense forest surrounding the camp through detours of well over 200 kms through Karbianglong and NC Hills. I therefore nominated 181 Mtn Bde who were based at Diphu to undertake the task, with four bns. They were to travel manpack through the forest on designated routes. I advised them to carry at least two 81 mm mors per bn and adequate amn manpack.

I had meanwhile contacted my NDA course mate who was the IAF Stn Cdr Jorhat to conduct an AN 32 trg sortie, so that I could fly over the area in the aircraft and photograph it. We then did so unofficially and loc the camp, though it took some doing to convince him to help us.

We then set off on the raid – I was flying overhd in a heptr with a GPS device and radio set on the Div and Bde net to guide them on to the camp. The Bde appch the camp from all directions by passing the EW satellite camps with the help of the Kuki guides and hit the main camp just after first lt – I was overhd guiding them. As the raid was in progress the ft colns were detected by the NSCN and firing started. My heptr was also seen and shot at with a .50 mm AA craft MG. My pilot was unfortunately wounded and we had to divert to and land at Dimapur which was not too far away.

The NSCN (I & M) insurgents suffered very hy cas – my men had even fired mortars as the engagement between our men and the insurgents was intense. It was only later that we came to know that the NSCN (I & M)had deployed their STF Bn (800 men) to protect the camp and had managed to smuggle out the ldrship just as the raid commenced – that was only a slightly less strong than our raiding force. Consequent to this raid the NSCN (I & M) called for peace and a CF and talks, which remains in place even today!

Imp of Int in CI Ops for pin point strikes

              The main lessons I learnt from the CI ops in the NE where we were so sparsely dply was that one must launch ops only based on hard int – there are then less cas and there is much less harassment to the local pop. The other lesson was that one must know the trn, the local pop and the insurgent characteristics backwards. I also learnt that in order to earn the trust of the local pop one must be fair and simply not permit atrocities – I had to order six GCMs to deal with such offenders.

              During and at the end of this tenure I was again very fortunate in that I was awarded a VSM for my wk during my tenure as BGS HQs 4 Corps and an AVSM for my efforts in the op fd. After a little less than two yrs I received my posting as the MGGS at HQ CC Lucknow.

MGGS CC

Just before I was posted out of HQ CC, I happened to participate in a a very high level War Game where in I was part of the Redland syndicate (Pakistan) which was to attack India – part of it was to capture J & K. Interestingly we came up with a Redland plan of offensive similar to the actual Pak plan for attack at Kargil in 99 and for capture of Kashmir Valley – I therefore remain most perturbed that if we could come up with such a plan, why we were surprised by the Pak Army at Kargil and in the Valley.

15 Corps

I was initially posted as COS 15 Corps in Jul 99. I was briefed personally by the COAS that I had been spec selected by him to clear up things in Kashmir and Ladakh in the aftermath of the Kargil War. I subsequently took over as GOC from Lt Gen Kishanpal who had commanded 15 Corps during the Kargil War (a tremendous Gen Offr and a great Regtl soldier) in Nov 99. Gen Kishanpal’s performance in clearing out the Pakistanis from Kargil was superlative!

Reactivation of the Proxy War in J & K  

One of Pakistan’s aims of the Kargil conflict was to use the opportunity of our tps being engaged at Kargil, to infilt max possible foreign mujaheedin into J & K regions in 99. They were to reactivate terrorism that was dying out in these regions.  Thus while Kargil and the rest of Ladakh (incl Siachen) took up a lot of General Kishanpal’s and our attention, Kashmir was boiling, due to the influx of about 3000 terrorists into the Kashmir region.

Pakistan’ new strat saw the start of suicide attacks and attacks on Army CT op bases and govt instlns. Pakistan orchestrated it accordingly, with violence reaching a peak by early 2000. There were also the killing of Sikhs to force their migration; killing of anti terrorism/anti Pak/and pro-India civilians; with a view to coerce the local pop into sp the foreign mujaheedin. In Dec 99, we also saw Pak’s renewed efforts to prove themselves to their nation, by organising the hijack of IA flt IC 814 from Kathmandu to Kandahar, along with the full planeload of passengers and the hostage drama that followed there from, so dramatically covered in Jaswant Singh’s book, ‘A Call to Honour’.

This contributed to our taking two yrs of very high intensity and sustained CT ops wherein I was directly involved being the GOC 15 Corps, in bringing the sit back under control by 2001. This was possible, not only because of the actions of tps, but also because of the sp of the local pop.

Re-dply in Ladakh

              The Kargil conflict had drawn out a large proportion of the resources from both J & K regions, besides resulting in dply of the bulk of the IA Forces, to meet any other sit that may arise on our Western Borders with Pak. In the Kargil sect, a taken decision was to enhance IA dply as a permt measure. Consequently the IA dply another mtn div, where we earlier had only an indep bde.

This entire phase of the operation was literally a lgs nightmare and was as imp as the eviction ops themselves. This fact has unfortunately never been highlighted, in-spite of the acknowledged facts that one of the reasons for Pak’s defeat in Kargil, was lgs failure. There was pressure therefore, both in Ladakh to complete this task and to find the resources; and get effective CT ops going in the J & K regions, with a shoestring availability of resources. We also had to very closely monitor the LAC and the Chinese and be prepared for facing any action initiated by the PLA in support of Pak while we were clearing up the area or any effort by the PLA to exploit the sit at that pt in time.

My functioning to deal with the sit

Ladakh

              With so much happening in the Corps Z, I was on the mov visiting and guiding units every day either by heptr or by road. 15 Corps had been given a lage number of addl units from May 99 onwards to deal with the crisis on the LOC in Ladakh and for CT ops in Kashmir. In Aug 99 we were told that the Paks had been pushed back and that we have to manage with our own resources. A large number of resources started mov out – both from Ladakh and from Kashmir. I literally cried ‘Blue Murder’ but to no avail. We therefore had to redply so as to cover the areas more effectively.

Kashmir Region, LOC Def and C Infilt Operations

              The LOC fmns of 15 Corps in the Kashmir region also had to continue to be monitored closely to ensure that the Pak Army did not get upto any mischief. This incl def of the territorial integrity of the region and C infilt to stop the very large number of terrorists coming in through the heavily forested area along the LOC. On detailed analysis in conjunc with all offrs in 15 Corps we formed a view that the tps at the posts must not be saddled with C infilt tasks – their job was solely to defend our territorial integrity and their post against attack. Tps for C infilt must be dply slightly in depth in two tiers with res to deal with infilt terrorists. It was imperative that units involved in C Infilt institute a very eff int and svl grid and that would guide the bns towards successful ops.

I recollect the case of 1 Assam. Within a week of 1 Assam’s arr at Sonapindi Gali, I visited the bn and shared int inputs of large scale infilt of LET cadres through their area shortly and my views on countering infilt. I advised them of the routes being used, which had not been eff covered by the bn dply there before them. I advised 1 Assam how to dply area ambushes to cover the area in depth. I had my int boys warn 1 Assam two days before the infilt was to commence. Needless to say that, 1 Assam performed superbly – in the next 14 days we recd confirmed reps that no less than 42 trts had been killed in their ambush. The word then spread around that if infilt was attempted through 1 Assam area they would be eaten alive. I also briefed 9 and 15 ASSAM who also had great success and earned similar reputations.

CT Ops

After the wdr of some 18 units worth of tps post Kargil from the Valley we had to redply the entire CT grid. After the redply CT Grid was primarily looked after by the RR Bns whose bread and butter was CT. They performed very well.  Hot spots however were reinforced by normal inf bns. Interestingly on the CT Grid we started performing better with fewer resources – on analysis we found that with less units they were not intruding into each other’s AOR which made int gathering and pin pt ops more eff.

I would like to stress that the performance of ASSAM Regt tps deployed in the Valley during my tenure was beyond compare, particularly in heavily forested mtn areas. The units involved were 1 Assam at Machhal Sect, 7 Assam at Tangdhar, 8 Assam at Lolab, 9 Assam at Ustad, Kupwara sector, 15 Assam at Gandharbal and then Uri, 35 RR, 42 RR and 119 Inf Bn (TA). 35 and 42 RR kept their areas totally under cont and performed exceptionally well. 119 TA Bn – performed just like a normal inf bn and did extremely well and protected the Corps HQs very effectively. I had specially requested for these Bns to help clear the Valley of terrorists quickly.

My pattern of Functioning

              In Jul/Aug 99 I used to follow the pattern I had learnt from CI Ops in the NE. I would not tell anyone where I was going the following day – I would just land up on the unit or HQs I planned to visit – that ensured more eff security and ensured that people did not waste their time on laying out red carpets and lavish meals. I remember early one morning at first light I flew straight to a remote company post on the LOC on the Pir Panjal Mtns. As I landed I was told that the coy cdr was sleeping – I told the JCO who had met me to take me to his tent – I woke him up and gave him the wks. That ensured people were alert and did their jobs sincerely.

I would invariably make my heptr pilot fly at treetop level. I had along with me a SO with a radio set and a GPS device. Both of us would keep our eyes open for infilt terrorist hideouts in the forests – they could be identified by plastic sheets /tarpaulines/ ftprints in the snow. On spotting them we would pass back the coordinates to the nearest units who would imdtly push out colns to neutralise the gp – at times we would get 20 to 30 of them napping together, till the Paks caught on what was happening.

God had earlier been kind to me while flying – I had two heptr accidents – one a crash due to the engine cutting off in Subansiri sector in the NER and in the other my heptr was shot up while raiding the NSCN (I & M) camp in the NE wherein on both occasions the heptrs were write offs due to being damaged beyond repair, whereas I was lucky to come out with minor injuries. In Kashmir also while out on a visit to a Bn HQs near Wullar Lake and climbing to about 300 ft in the heptr after the visit, the engine again suddenly cut off – we were quite high and I thought that my time had come – but my pilots were excellent and managed to glide the helicopter and crash land it onto a fd close to the Bn HQs. The pilots were safe; my SO had unfortunately broken his arm, while my nose and face were bleeding profusely. We were taken to the treatment room there and given first aid – the pilots called for another heptr to evac us back to the Corps HQs – I had managed to bang and break my nose but otherwise all was well. Here again the heptr was a write off.

We laid a great deal of emphasis on electronic int. We placed our sig interception and DF eqpt at all imp areas in the Kashmir Valley on hts so as to pick up all terrorist linked radio transmissions. The IB and the RAW did their part by intercepting satellite and e mail comns of the trts. Based on this we had prepa a central electronics int map in the ops room giving details of where the transmissions were from and their content. That clearly indicated the areas of trt concs. This inte was then passed on to all tps.

The electronic DFs also helped us to ident the main trt electronic hubs in the Valley which relayed all messages to them from Pak Army from across the LOC who con their ops – one was on the Pir Panjal and the other on the mtns next to Traal – in fact on electronic mapping of the Valley we found that these were the only two places from where such actions could be conducted. We raided these and neutr them. We also conc on blocking funding to the trts and achieved success in our efforts. This was done through close coop between army int agencies, the IB, RAW and the Kashmir Police. The overgrnd ldrship including the APHC were closely monitored.

              I had befriended a large number of local people – they were a great source of int and advice in handling of the locals. Incidentally they also fed me wonderful Kashmiri food. While I hear everyone now cursing Farukh Abdullah and his son Omar the former CMs, we became friends – in my view he was actually a nationalist, but a victim of circumstances and of course an opportunist as all politicians are. I also befriended the police, the beauracracy, the int agencies and the PMF ldrship in Valley – we thus became a friendly composite team and functioned eff together without allowing egos to come in our way.

People Friendly Operations

              By launch of people friendly Counter Terrorist operations, coupled with military civic action to win over the people’s hearts and minds, we were able to bring the terrorists to book. I recollect an incident wherein some civs had very unfortunately died during ops, consequent to which there was mass agitation in the Kashmir Valley, which contd for some days. My conscience dictated that I go public, apologize for our mistakes if any, mollify and request the public at large to desist from their agitation through the electronic and print media. This measure imdtly stopped the agitation, only because we had appealed to the conscience of the people and apologized and the Kashmiri media (to their total credit) wholeheartedly sp us. Such an apology by a serving Gen was unheard of, but went a long way towards winning the confidence of the people, irrespective of the ire and criticism I subsequently drew from some in higher HQs in the Army.

Notwithstanding this, it was the people’s coop and their disgust with Pak, coupled with people friendly CT ops that resulted in our being able to bring the highest ever number of trts to book till date, from Aug 99 to Dec 2001 – well over 2000 trts had been neutr and peace brought back to the Kashmir Valley.

HM CF

During this pd, there were also initiatives by Abdul Majid Dar the overall Cdr of the HM in the Kashmir Valley and his Div Cdrs, to declare a CF and start a peace initiative with the G of I. The HM was the largest trt outfit, with about 50% Kashmiris in it and op in J & K. By this time, all other trt outfits had a preponderance of foreign terrorists. The G of I’s positive, though ambivalent response and HM peace negotiations with the APHC ldrs and other imp figures in J & K, was like a breath of fresh air in J & K. The message of peace spread like wildfire amongst the pop of Kashmir.

I had with the approval of my Army Cdr and the COAS got together with the Hds of the main Int Agencies in the Valley to try and take the deal with the HM fwd. I agreed to keep Abdul Majid Dar as my personal guest in my Residence at the Chinar Lodge at Badamibagh (HQs 15 Corps loc). This was unknown even to any of my staff including my ADC, SO, the BGS and my personal security staff. I had also got one of the gates to the HQs manned by my gds and had sworn them to secrecy so that we could come and go into town surreptitiously at ni for discussions with local ldrs in conjunc with the hds of the Int Agencies. I would go out around midni with Abdul armed with a pistol dressed like the locals to do so without escorts.

After some time also I brought the HM Div Cdr North, South and Centre into my residence as guests. We were therefore able to discuss issues related to the terrorism in the Valley in all its facets incl details of Pak’s sp. They stayed with me for a good two months. They frequently had to pass messages on their satellite phone to their men in the Valley/POK– this was invariably picked by my electronic int team who would in turn galvanise the gd bn 119 TA into action to loc the trt intruders on the hts above my residence to no avail – little did they realise that it was the Corps Cdrs ‘guests’ making transmissions! The constant interaction with my ‘Guests’ helped me tremendously in achieving a very high degree of success in CT ops. These interactions facilitated a total understanding of everything related to the trt activity both in J & K and POK as also the pulse of the local people.

Unfortunately, the HM CF was short lived, as Pak and the ISI panicked at the thought of a peace deal brokered by the HM in J & K while the G of I dilly dallied and as usual took their own sweet time in decision making to officially declare their sp for Abdul Majid Dar. They therefore attempted to sabotage the CF, by having the Hd of the HM in, Syed Salahuddin, who was under Pak ISI cont, wdr the CF offer, on gds of India’s refusal to include Pak in the talks. HM valley based cadres refused to comply with Syed Salahadin’s instrs. Consequently, an unofficial HM/SF CF contd on grnd for quite some time.

Due to these happenings, the Pak ISI got Syed Salahuddin to issue recall orders to all their op cdrs, which they refused to obey. Finally, the assassination of all these cdrs by Pak ISI  sponsored hit squads and further upgradation of violence in J & K by the JEM and LET, took place when they left my residence and went into the open. Notwithstanding this, it must be noted that Abdul Majid Dar was revered in the Valley and was dedicated to the cause of ending the problem and would have been an excellent ldr for Kashmir. The G of I lost an excellent opportunity for problem resolution in this regard. These events resulted in the other pro Pak trts making all out efforts, through mass killing of Sikhs in the Valley and Hindu minorities and labourers in other places, to try and break the HM/SF  CF.

Non -Initiation of Combat Ops  

The G of I then made a CF attempt in an attempt at goodwill in the form of the Non Initiation of Combat Operations (NICO) during Ramzan, by the SF, as part of their efforts to bring about peace. The highest political auth himself directed me in the presence of many others; notwithstanding my objections that unless fired at, the SF would not fire upon the trts and drastically reduce their activity levels – in their words wdr to bks. I brought out that implementation of the same would lead to hy cas on our side (for which I had to bear the repercussions later for questioning their instrs). The measure was unfortunately ill conceived and protested against, as greater casualties to the SF, our informers and pro India elements were inevitable. The NICO did not succeed, in spite of our best efforts to comply with the G of I orders as the trts were not part of the CF. It only led to the trts getting a respite, being able to recoup, resuscitate, eliminate SF sources and sympathisers and indulge in more unchallenged violence. There were in fact much more SF and civ cas in this pd. The authorities were then themselves forced to cancel the NICO due to large scale civ cas within a month. Notwithstanding these setbacks,thereafter  consequent to our sustained CT ops, we again brought the sit under cont. Normalcy returned to the entire area, with unprecedented increase in tourism, J & K economy thriving and tourism rising to a high after about three months.

Redeployments and Preparations for War

              A great deal of effort was also put in by me to dply tps more cost eff along the LOC with a view to achieve better C infilt results and better def of the borders – this was because of Pak’s rptd threats to do another Kargil on us. It must be noted that though the Kargil sect grew progressively more silent, the LOC in the Kashmir and Jammu Regions became much more active with constant arty shelling and small-scale ops. It was quite normal to strike at the Pak posns across the LOC and at trt launch pads by raids across the LOC and hy Arty fire in retaliation for their activities – no sanction was needed for such actions from higher HQs – we merely kept them info – the so called “surgical strikes” were therefore not anything new. At that stage all of us in 15 Corps were actively getting into readiness to defeat Pakistan if opportunity so permitted.  A div worth of res were recreated from within the Corps and realistic trg and preps carried for out for striking at Pak. By mid 2001 we were ready with well rehearsed plans to strike into Pak should the sit so arise.

Elections in J & K

We also saw elections with high voter turnout in J & K and Dr Farooq Abdullah falling from political grace, notwithstanding the fact that the NC had won a majority in Kashmir proper. The PDP of Mufti Mahmud and the INC formed an electoral alliance and a coalition Govt. This was widely acclaimed by the people as also internationally, for the free and fair elections, and the change of gd known to be sympathetic to the HM. It was also very clear that separatism had progressively decreased with return of proper democracy. Interestingly in the Market and Opinion Research International Svy (2002) Poll of 2002, conducted by a largely anti India org from UK, with a survey base largely from Srinagar, only 6 % Kashmiri Muslims wanted to join Pakistan, 61 % wanted to remain with India and 33% were undecided.

I was at this stage posted out of 15 Corps as COS HQs EC at Kolkata. Thus ended my tenure as the GOC of 15 Corps – I had been the longest serving Corps Cdr of this wonderful fmn in an extremely active and wartime environment – I had done my duty to the best of my ability and had due to the efforts of my offrs, men and myself achieved results that had never been achieved before in 15 Corps. I was greatly honoured when the CM, the State Govt, the J & K Police, PMF/ CPOs and the Int Agencies gave me fond farewells. The Kashmiri media even did a nice piece (very unusual) on me which bolstered my ego!

I am also extremely proud that I was awarded an PVSM  by the President of India during and in the midst of my tenure as GOC 15 Corps for my services to India in J & K as the COS and then GOC 15 Corps for my efforts towards bringing the sit under cont. The PVSM is normally only awarded for overall service just before or after retirement to Gen Offrs. My PVSM almost amounted to being a gallantry award which was extremely unusual, rare and a great honour.

COS EC

In Jan 02, I was posted to HQs EC as the COS as there were no other suitable vacancies they could find for me – I was very happy to get Calcutta as a last posting. The EC Army Cdrs and I were able to function effectively as a team. I was now finally in a position to influence the Army Cdrs into making many of the changes in op and lgs policy and concepts that I had always felt were essential from my earlier experiences in EC. We were also able to get two new divs sanctioned to str the defs and give the Comd some offensive capability.I was also able to guide the CI philosophy in the entire NER. I along with the Army Commander was one of the personages to influence the King of Bhutan to launch very highly successful ops in South Bhutan against the IIGs who had taken sanctuary in there and on our side of the border; guide 4 Corps tps in ops to seal the border to the South to nab escaping IIGs. We simultaneously launched ops against all IIGs in Meghalaya and in Assam and along the Indo Myanmar border in Tirap and Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh incl conduct of shallow cross border raids where essential as a result of which insurgency was largely brought under cont in these areas.

Due to my knowledge of the trn and people I was able to also speak to Khaplang and Muivah of the NSCN (both factions) personally and advise them to take the peace process seriously – Khaplang particularly had great distrust for the Indian Govt as he claimed that they had committed breach of trust with him on more than one occasion. Towards the end of my tenure we were thus able to bring about greater peace in the NER than had been seen previously.

This was also an excellent tenure from the Regtl point of view. I alongwith Gen Kishanpal of my Regt, the then QMG, was able to push through the ARC KLP, the md accn projects and, even more importantly, interact with all the State Govts of the NER in relation to the welfare of our serving soldiers and ESM. It was fortunate that sometime thereafter, Lt Gen RN Singh, PVSM, AVSM SM, VSM (Retd), also held the same appt – unfortunately his tenure as COS was very short. It would of course be ideal if we could have the Army Cdrs or COS of EC from the Regt. 

Retmt and CENERS – K 

In 2008, Gen Shankar, Roychoudhuri, Maj Gen Arun Roye, and I, all retd, alongwith some other gentlemen, decided to set up a Think Tank (CENERS – K) based in Kolkata. There were no other think tanks in Kolkata as all were based in Delhi and surroundings. Our focus was to be all matters of importance affecting Eastern, NE India and the Eastern Hemisphere with emphasis on strat, geopol and financial aspects. Our members’ composn was to be retd Armed Forces, IAS, Indian, IPS offrs, Academics, a few industrialists and imp members of civ society. Arun and I along with a few other members donated some money to start the ball rolling. We did not want to be totally Govt funded as we wanted freedom of action to function.

Our events were to be lectures, discussions and seminars both in the East and NE and be sponsored partly by the Govts and industry. Our events over the years have been conducted all over the NER and in Kolkata and have been well received. Gen Shankar Roychoudhury was our first President and after his term ended he became our Patron. ACM Arup Raha has just ended his term as our President and now I am now the new President.

              We have all kept very busy running this Think Tank and earning much acclaim till date. Our activities during the last four months have however got restricted due to the Corona Virus Pandemic. We are now planning to switch more to virtual activities like webinars. I have actively participated in CENERS, Kolkata activities notwithstanding being quite unwell fairly frequently. In fact keeping busy with such activity tends to one’s mind off one’s health problems.

Shortly after retirement I was approached by the Editor in Chief of the Statesman to start writing an editorial page column for them for their Sunday edition on the NER and other contemporary issues. I thought over it and I then started writing for them on a regular basis for their Sunday paper on the NER, J & K, Maoism and other contemporary issues. I rather enjoyed it and wrote for them till I got cancer in 2005 – I have however started writing the odd artcle when I so desire.

Having written so much on these subjects for the newspaper, I decided I would write my own book on the NER titled “An Insiders Experience of Insurgency in India’s North East. My daughter Chabi designed a beautiful cover for it. It was a great pleasure writing it and agonising when my editor would tear it to bits and make me rewrite parts but it was a labour of love. It was then published by a UK based coy called the Anthem Press of the Wimbledon Publishing Coy. Gen Pillai wrote a wonderful ‘Forward’ for me. The book was well received and went through three reprints and is now no longer available except on Amazon for a preposterous price of Rs 6500/- (it’s actual price is only 400/-). I am now trying to get the Coy to give me a No Objection Certificate so that I can update and reprint it as their Indian Br closed down in 2009 due to the recession.

In 2007 I wrote a long manuscript on J & K describing all my experiences there. My publisher was quite insistent that I cover details which I felt I was in no position to do due to my liability under the Indian Official Secrets Act. I refused to do so – the manuscript now lies with me for posterity – however parts of it will be incorporated in my next book on my “Reminiscences” which I hope would be published shortly.

The year after I retired I was diagnosed with prostate cancer which had spread  When the biopsy was done – I was pronounced to be having terminal cancer and that I had only a month to live. I then had to go immediately to Delhi for a second opinion and treatment if feasible – this was done at AIIMS as the IA at that stage did not offer cancer treatment to ESM due to ltd resources. At AIIMS I was looked after by the Hd of Dept a Dr Jhulka – a wonderful and most competent doctor. He said the Army was wrong – though I did have cancer of the prostate which was adv and had spread I was nowhere near dying and that the cancer was treatable and that he would treat it. He also agreed to send the sample to Tata’s at Bombay for another opinion. Tata’s confirmed AIIMS diagnosis. I then underwent agonising treatment as an out patient at AIIMS for the next three months. Col Maniram my Bn offr put up Linda and I in his Mess where he was the CO. He and his wife looked after us so well it was unbelievable – I will forever be indebted to him and Mrs Maniram and Col VK Sharma who looked after us so well in our time of need.

After a couple of years I started having acute problems with my motions. The Gastroenterologist diagnosed it as Diverticulitis which is the partial blockage of the which I am advised was a side effect of the radiation I had undergone for the cancer.

In 2011, I had a relapse of my prostate cancer and had to restart treatment which had been stopped in 2007. The treatment again was stopped after 24 months. I then had my second relapse in 2016 and was again put on treatment with different drugs – however my condition again started deteriorating in 2018 as I had become immune to the cancer drugs. The cancer had apparently metastasized to my liver.

 I have now been diagnosed with Stage 4 Cancer and am apparently on borrowed time and God’s will – I am now on a trial drug (which has tremendous ill side effects) and a whole pile of home remedies and herbal medicines which seem to be keeping me going. I am advised I have to continue on the trial drug as long as I live.

Notwithstanding what I or my daughter went through to get treated for Cancer at Delhi, there is a requirement to institutionalise reception and looking after all such patients as it is now totally adhoc.

Regimental Activities

              After recovering from my first relapse in the cancer I got very busy on writing the third volume of the History of the Assam Regt alongwith Colonel Mani Gahatraj and Brigadier Jasbir Bawa. That involved going to Shillong frequently and was a labour of love. We also participated very actively in the Regt’s Platinum Jubillee at Shillong even though I was then onto my second relapse in the cancer. These were all wonderful experiences.